Towards the Public?
–the Dilemma in Chinese Media Policy Change and Its Influential Factors

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Abstract

The research is to examine the changes in Chinese media policy and to analyze the factors influencing these changes. It also discusses the possible trend of the policy. Within the context of China’s reform, Chinese media policy has undertaken 3 stages of transition, known as marketization (since early 1980s), conglomeration (since mid-1990s) and capitalization (from 2003 on). Having opened up the media to the market by allowing it to be financially self-sufficient instead of relying on government subsidies, the government is still strictly wielding ideological, personnel and policy control over media. The dilemma of choosing between openness and control is the natural result of the gambling and bargaining within various interests groups. Economic globalization spurs international and domestic non-state capitals to enter the Chinese media market by lobbying and channeling into the media policy process. Political decentralization results in departmentalism and localism, which brings about a myriad of bargain forces to impact on the media policy and its implementation. The most noteworthy influential factor is social mobilization. It includes the popularity of information and communications technology, social stratification and polarization, the ascending consciousness of civil rights and the increasing professionalism. Public interests have become a key role in consolidating political legitimacy and social integrity. The policy makers have to value the public interests, and this conflict of diverse interests is still going on. Therefore, the media policy would likely develop in two different directions. One is corporatism, meaning that government and commercial powers can exclusively sustain mutually-legitimating relationship. The other is a quasi-public media system under the control of government within the established political system, which could provide more access to diverse information and the public sphere - for the public to participate and represent - which is of help to legitimate the political power by maintaining a balance of various interests and reaching a compromise.

Keywords: Chinese media policy, the public, corporatism, a quasi-public media system
Introduction

1. Background

Since the open-door policy of China in the late 1970s, social environment of Chinese media has tremendously changed, which also led to the alteration of Chinese media policy and system.

In the past more than twenty years Chinese economy has grown drastically, which is featured by liberalization, privatization, marketization. These transitions have brought about increasing marketization of Chinese media, which provides them more opportunities to make profits by carrying advertisements.

In Chinese case, media are still heavily controlled within one-party system. They are closely associated with political ideology. In the past years the traditionally orthodox ideology of politics has become more sophisticated, Chinese-context oriented pragmatism.

Within this macro changing context the media sector in China has already undertaken the three stages of transition, which could be divided into three overlapping stages as commercialization (or marketization), conglomeration, and capitalization. Each stage started in the early 1980s, mid-1990s and 2003 respectively. These transitions happened in media sector have dramatically changed the media scene in China. In terms of ownership, media in China are still state-owned organizations, not companies. But in the sense of financing sources, they are more financially supported by advertising rather than subsidies from government. Therefore, ratings and circulations are becoming unprecedented critical factors for all media in China, just as important as those in commercial media system. With regard to media structure, all Chinese media are still structured as Chinese government body rather than media network in the USA, UK and some other countries. Chinese media scene could be described as “Single System, Dual Operations”, the single system refers to the state ownership and the dual operations are seen as a unique approach to commercialize China’s media while fulfilling the political tasks.

Although lots of changes have taken place in the Chinese media system, policy and structure, and many of which are going even farther beyond many people imagined and expected, a number of basic problems have still been left untouched since then.

One of the most critical problems is media policy. Many media policies are not transparent, uncertain, volatile, and unforecastable. Chinese media are quite often obsessed by those uncertain media policy. To some extent and in many occasions Chinese media are testing the border of policy and tolerance of controller. They call this as a tightrope walking. The policy making and implementation of Chinese media sector have followed a two-step forward, one-step backward, and zigzag route instead of down straight forward for years.

The status quo of Chinese media policy and system change can be characterized as a kind of dynamic dilemma of co-existence of control and openness, which is due to the interplay of different interest groups maximizing their own interests and powers. Entirely depending on the political stability, media policy in China can, frequently and easily, swing between control and openness.

The status quo and the future, the short-term trend in particular, of Chinese media policy and system could be described as a hybrid, which would be consistent with the current hybrid system of political communism and economic capitalism in China. This change is different from that in
Western world and that in Eastern European countries as well.

2, Objective and method

The goal of the research is to examine the factors influencing Chinese media policy and system change, to find out what forces, and at which degree, are exerting impacts on the change. Finally the report will discuss two separate trends of Chinese media policy transition.

A lot of researches have been done on Chinese media. Many pundits of communication and media studies out of China have focused their studies on Chinese media structure transform, political implication of media reform, the impact of commercialization on the Chinese media system, interrelationships between media and society and so forth.¹

Many political scientists, economists and sociologists also have published a myriad of diversified studies on Chinese political system, policy, economic reform, governance, civil society, social transitions. All of the studies could be a contextual framework for Chinese media policy analysis.²

I will examine the change in Chinese media policy from the perspective of political economy and transitional society studies. What I manage to improve is not only to adapt the established paradigm to Chinese media policy studies, but to improve the analytical framework to a related but distinct one because “The mainstream theories are framed with certain particularities of the United States in mind, and that they do not take in account the issues of change, power, conflict and the rest that are so sharply raised”.³

The basic and dominant framework for analyzing Chinese media change heretofore has been a “party-state vs. market” paradigm, which implies that the Chinese Communist party-state is a dominantly monolithic entity promoting marketization of economy, while still exerting strict control over media system. It has been a very significant context in which Chinese media system is examined. But some important potentially dynamic forces, such as social awareness of civil rights, which have just appeared in the past two and three years especially after SARS and already played an increasingly important role in Chinese media transition, have been ignored or at least paid less attention to.

This two-polar framework – party-state vs. market - should be enriched to a new three-polar conceptual paradigm, which includes political (party-state), commercial (domestic and global capitals) and public factors (ascending desire for public interests).

My research will try to analyze this incrementally complex interplay of three uneven factors within the process of media policy change and try to find its possible impact-- to what extent, in which direction-- on trend of Chinese media policy transition.

As far as media policy is in general concerned, I would borrow Professors Cuilenburg and McQuail’s paradigm as a basic structure to analyze changes in the Chinese media policy and system. They also use the tripartite division. Political welfare which includes freedom of expression, equality, participation, diversity, public accountability; Social welfare, which means social order, cohesion, quality and so forth; Economic welfare, which is consisted of efficiency, employment and profitability and so forth.⁴

Figure 1: An emerging new communications policy paradigm
The Context of and Dilemma in Chinese Media Policy Change

In this part, the research will outline briefly the critical changes in Chinese media policy and system in the past 20 years, then frame the dilemma in media policy caused by diversified powers within the background of Chinese transition.

1. The context of Chinese media policy change

“In contemporary societies it is at least widely assumed that differential access to the means of communication or the benefits of communication (information, channels of contact) is closely related to the exercise of political and economic power.”

In the case of Chinese media policy, political and economic powers wield influence on the media policy. Chinese economic liberalization has given the birth to media business, mainly advertising. The advertising operations, concerted with other businesses, have developed more possibilities for media outlets to be relatively independent in the sense of finance. Meanwhile, media are becoming more competitive in terms of market share under the increasing pressure of market-oriented reform. Ratings and circulations are the basic concern of all media outlets in China now, though they still have to obey the bottom line set by the Party and have to complete the political propaganda tasks ordered by the Party.

Along with the Chinese economic growth, the need from Chinese media users for more access to information is becoming much stronger than ever before. This desire for more pluralism is challenging the traditional political ideology, which has been monolithic and uniform under the
one party. Actually Chinese political system especially the party has been undertaking de-ideologization and re-ideologization to meet the challenge from more diverse, less rigid society.

Some scholars have argued that the Chinese government defused this ideological and social tension by “de-ideologizing” its governing philosophy, which means by dropping the antagonism between “capitalism” and “socialism” following Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 trip to the south, and by allowing the rapid emergence of a private economy. The result was the emergence of an interest-based politics, which, by the end of the 1990s, was already making new and perhaps more urgent demands for political reform.⁶

At the same time, the Chinese government is also re-ideologizing the value system of political configuration in order to re-legitimize its power based on more consensus from various interest groups. The newly re-ideologizing trial is slowly moving on the trajectory of being less orthodox communist, more inclusive, more neutral, sophisticated, popularistic and pragmatic transformations.

Since the government is still looking for and building up the new political ideology, a potential problem would be that for China’s media policy making, the absence of convincing and new ideology will leave a space for political power and capital power to erode the public interests and related value system that have already been quite vulnerable in China due to more than 20-year commercialization and pragmatism.

With regard to Chinese society, it has also become more stratified, diversified and mobilized. The ever monolithic social uniformity is being replaced by a myriad of gaps, between the rich and the poor, the winner and the loser of reform, the eastern and the western part, the urban and the rural regions, and so forth. This pluralism and diversity have led to booming of distinct needs of segmented audience for access and information.

The context described above is more macro-level one for the change in Chinese media policy. Media policy is actually made and implemented more under micro circumstances as media sector per se. China has a completely distinct media structure, compared with that in the West.

Chinese media structure is entirely consistent with Chinese government structure because of its government ownership. There are two parts mingled together in this structure. One is the horizontal sector coordinating system (pieces, kuai, 块), which means various government regulators and policy-makers are in charge of different media sectors such as broadcasting, press, online and telecommunications. And regulators and media in different sectors have to coordinate with each other.

Figure 2: the structure of communications sectors vs. government regulators
The other part is the vertical four-tier linkage (lines, tiao 条), which means one government organization within one media sector from state, provincial down to city and county levels is in charge of the same media sector respectively. It is a kind of coordination from center to locality.

In addition to “Single System, Dual Operations”, the Chinese media is also featured as “the four-tier media structure”, which means national media are usually owned by the state government, the provincial governments own and operate their provincial media, city and county follow the same model and have their own media outlets.\(^7\)

In general government regulators at different tiers own, regulate and operate their media, but the content in all media are mainly controlled by the Party system, which also has the similar four-tier party units called Propaganda Department in charge of political information and other control over contents.

“The matrix muddle”\(^8\)-like institutional infrastructure concerning media policy and regulation in China is very Chinese style. It is usually highly efficient in the flow of political information, but it is also stymied by the conflicts among multi-entities due to the protectionism of their own interests. So media outlets in China are playing different roles in Chinese society, on the one hand, they are political collaborators because they have to coordinate to fulfill the political tasks like propaganda, but on the other hand, they are competitors on market because they have to make profit by advertising in order to survive.

It would be necessary for us to analyze the context first, then we can better understand the changes in Chinese media policy.

2. The important changes in Chinese media policy and system since the open-door policy
The media policy is comprised of the goal and objectives to be pursued; the values and criteria by which goals are defined or recognized; the various content and communication services to which policy applies; the different distribution services (mainly print publishing, cable, satellite and broadcast dissemination and telecommunications); and the appropriate policy measures and means of implementation (mainly embodied in law, regulation, self-regulation or market practices).\(^9\)
The path of Chinese media policy evolution is characterized by internally tight controlling, but externally de-regulating. It implies that media should be very strictly gate-kept in political sense in order to enforce the leading position of the Party in ideology, but, meanwhile, should be de-regulated in terms of media businesses. The other characteristic concerning Chinese media policy change is to de-regulate the print media, distribution and more peripheral media for the first, then entertainment-related content. The last and still strictly controlled area is the news, current affairs, political information and propaganda, which is also called the core part of the media.

The media policy in China has experienced three stages of transformation in the past 3 decades.

The first stage was from 1978 to 2000, which led to the transformation of media structure. There were three critical turning points during this period. One was in 1978, when the government issued a policy removing the rein on media advertising. This could be regarded as the first sign for Chinese media policy to start de-regulation, especially in the less ideological arenas. The second was in 1983, when the central government issued No. 37 Document. It allowed the governments at state, province, city and county level to establish their own media outlets including newspapers, radio stations, and TV stations. That signals the starting point of Chinese four-tier media structure, mingled with sector structure as we mentioned before. The third was in 1996, when the first media group in China – Guangzhou Daily Group – was established in January of that year. In the next three years since then, a series of documents issued by the state government and the Party ordered to merge the stations at city and county tiers. It started the process of consolidation in Chinese media circle, which has lasted for several years, resulted in more media groups in the early 21 century.

In general, the first stage of media policy change has at least two obvious consequences: four-tier structure and commercialization (marketization). But this period also triggered the consolidation.

The second stage was from 2001 to 2002, which was more market-oriented. Responding to China’s entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in late 2001, the Party and the state government issued the critical No. 17 Document in August, 2001. It mainly 1) strongly encouraged the cross-region and cross-sector consolidation of media and started to allow media outlets to finance themselves from various sources such as being listed on stock market, non-state investment in addition to increasing advertising, decreasing government subsidies; 2) broke the ice of capitalization, media conglomerates are allowed to collect capitals within the press, publishing, radio, film and TV system by exercising financing, bank loans, and share holding. Under the circumstance of state-share-dominance stocking, the reform of joint venture on radio and TV transmission network, the production of programs, and the distribution of publications were allowed to absorb foreign capitals as well as domestic non-state investment.

Several changes can been seen in this document: first, the function of the government has somewhat changed, that is, from a market player per se to a policy maker, regulator and supervisor; media outlets have shifted their status from affiliated organization to market players, and enjoying relative autonomy of economic activities such as capital management and structural adjustment.

Second, the government further undermines the interference into media economic activities, putting more emphasis on the integration of capitals and business, and lowering the market entry.

This stage can be characterized by 1) the scale of media industry enlarged because of de-regulation of media business and administratively established conglomerations; 2) media sectors were becoming more financially independent. They have been becoming less and less
dependent on government subsidies in terms of income. In 2004, the government subsidy to broadcasting media in China decreased to 10.7% of media total income. But with regard to conglomeration, it has not been successful as the Party and the state policy makers expected in the past several years. Conglomeration has been frustrated by its purpose, means, composition and nature. The original purpose of government to merge media entities was to maximize ideological control over media for political stability instead of maximization of profits, which is the rationale for Western media consolidation. So the state government used their administrative force to push different media to merge together rather than appealing to market. Chinese media groups are a blend of media outlets and government regulators, which means they just put media outlets such as newspapers, or stations and government bureaus together, which are regulators and administrators. After years of development, the whole broadcasting media in China gained a total annual income of up to 82.5 billion RMB Yuan (app. $10 billion) in 2004, but only Time Warner made an annual income of nearly $41.1 billion (2004).

The third stage of Chinese media policy change was from 2003 onward, which is featured as limited and controlled capitalization. The new generation of the Party and state government launched a large-scale “culture industry reform” including media sectors. The Party and the state promulgated No. 21 Document in July, 2003, which advocated deepening the institutional reform on culture industry. It marked that the reform on Chinese media policy entered a new era. The most important change was media should be separated into two sectors: public service sector and commercial sector. The core concept is to categorize media according to the level of ideology, locating public service sector in ideological area while commercial sector into the business and market.

According to the policy, all of those mainstream media entities like the party press, party journals, radio and TV stations, and main publishers must be state-owned, but will be given more space for them to be financially lucrative, and should improve their services. All of these media outlets should be public service units in nature providing news, current affairs, and political information. All of those non-propaganda resources such as advertising, printing, distribution, transmission and so forth could be regarded as commercial companies. Non-state investment and ownership would be allowed in these areas. All of these media companies should be business units in nature.

In 2004 the State Administration for Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) issued a new policy on the collaborative production of the TV program. The policy dictates that the Sino-foreign joint production of the TV program could be practiced by the establishment of joint-venture companies, but the admittance of investors is strictly regulated. The foreign investors must be professional media enterprises and the domestic TV and radio stations themselves are barred from setting up the joint venture, and only the program production companies owned by those stations are qualified to collaborate with foreign investors. What’s more, the registered capital of the joint venture should be no less than 50 million RMB Yuan (more than $6 million), and the proportion of the foreign capital should be no more than 49%.

In April, 2005, State Council issued a latest policy concerning the culture industry reform, which allows non-state capital to invest into culture industry including media in the area of production, distribution, cable network digitalization, advertising, cinema chains, entertainment, music, movie/TV drama, sports, lifestyle, science, new media business such as IPTV, Mobile TV, etc.
This stage is just starting and many policies are still under discussion. But we can already find there are at least three noteworthy distinctions. 1) It opened the entrance of non-state capitals into the media and culture sectors though they are still limited within some relatively peripheral businesses rather than core news parts. 2) The government began to pluralizing its way of regulation and control by utilizing rules, directives, and capital, business and market. 3) It would be more feasible and sophisticated to separate media sector into two different parts which can play two different roles respectively. 4) It is the first time for Chinese media policy makers to use the term “public service”. Although it is still an ambiguous definition, and also still hard to clarify that it would be the same or similar meaning with that in Western world, it is indeed one big step forward, which means the party-state not only realizes the importance of market and non-state capital, but starts being aware of the leverage of increasing public interests.

After examining the path of Chinese media policy evolution, we can clearly find the trend moving away from completely control over all media sectors towards completely control over the core part, which is propaganda, while partly de-regulating the other business in media sector. We can also find some obvious transition in terms of media entities. "Private enterprises ‘wearing red hats’, enterprises that are registered as collective enterprises for various reasons but are in reality privately owned, and enterprises under joint ownership with private businesspeople"12 can be found even in media market.

Table 1: A Typology of Chinese Media Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official mainstream media</th>
<th>Media organizations directly owned and operated by the government at central level; e.g. Xinhua News Agency, the People’s Daily, CCTV.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outer circles</td>
<td>Media units traditionally affiliated with central or local government institutions but not considered as official state media, such as trade papers and various regional news; e.g. China Industrial and Commercial News, Nanfang Weekend.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fringe media</td>
<td>Mass appeal newspapers and magazines, financially and managerially independent from the government; e.g. Cai Jing, 21st Century Economic News, some Internet portals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In terms of the way of government controls, we can notice some changes as well.

Table 2: Government Controls: Old and New

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political and ideological controls</th>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Now</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Censorship, punishment, fines, imprisonment.</td>
<td>Government censorship; Self-censorship; Access blocking.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If we compare the status quo of Chinese media with that at least five years ago, we can find more distinctions.

Table 3: Major Changes happened in Chinese media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Now</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>Directly state-owned, highly centralized for all information and distribution.</td>
<td>1. In theory and officially, still state-owned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Indirect ownership by collective and private businesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Publicly listed companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial support</td>
<td>Government-funded.</td>
<td>Chiefly advertising, circulation, financial investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Market hiring for professional management and editorial positions in non-key state media units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functions of the media</td>
<td>Single function; Mouthpiece of the Party; Ideological indoctrination.</td>
<td>Multiple functions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Mouthpiece of the Party,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Source for advertising,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. High circulation and audience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of media products</td>
<td>Political and ideological propaganda.</td>
<td>Propaganda as well as market commodity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Party news organs; Highly centralized.</td>
<td>Multi-structure:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Centralized state mainstream</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Actors | Party and government representatives. | Entrepreneurs, media professionals, entertainers, advertisers, semi-official interest groups.
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3, The dilemma in Chinese media policy change

The vacillation of the Chinese media policy between openness and control has made Chinese media system look like a mixture of political authoritarianism and capitalism. Actually one of main reasons for this is that “media organizations are affecting the creation of state policy by representing their own economic interests in terms of general public interests, which at the same time are performing the public functions imposed by the state. Meanwhile, the state continues to maintain its strategic control over the media market through licensing, regulating and allocating resources to specific state media”. 13

The dilemmas exist in policy makers, policy itself as well as policy implementation. As for the government, it has played multiple roles as media policy maker, media owner, resource distributor, controller, manager, supervisor for years. It has focused little attention on providing public services. So it remains hard for the government to change its roles in policy making process. The government makes media policy in more occasions not based on an established, stable rationale, which is transparency, predictability, and continuity and consistency, but on random, tentative political orders. So it is quite easy to find the Chinese media policies lack of deliberation and public participation, strategic arrangement and coordination. 14

With regard to policy implementation, it is becoming increasingly hard for many media policies to be implemented, especially in media outlets at different local levels just because of decentralization in political system, and departmentalism, localism. On the one hand, the policy often does not take local differences into account, so it makes local media hard to implement uniform policy; on the other hand, local media often focus on their own markets and interests regardless of central orders.

The reasons for dilemma are various, but the most important one is that the ideological straitjacket shaped by established political system in China. These political fetters and shackles are confronting challenges from globalization and pluralization, which are undermining the basis of the ideology.

The question concerning media policy is: whose interests should be protected and guaranteed? Which interest is influencing the whole society? National interests or Party-state interests; commercial, or the public interests?
Probably “partly because of the government’s dual role as owner and regulator and partly because of the traditional practices of a centrally planned economy, the government continues to maintain monopolies in many public services such as utilities and telecommunication”.  

The same thing happens in media.

“The origins of communications policies lie in the interaction between the pursuit of national interests by states and the operations of commercial/industrial enterprises…The specific content of government policies reflects the deal made in the particular time and place and the balance of power and advantage between government and industry”. But China is still a one-party political system. It is far distinct from the western system, the latter would consider policy “from first principles what can be argued to be the real essence of media regulation: the task of defending democratic and citizenship concerns”.

Actually as far as media policy concerned, a matter of public interest is affecting the society as a whole rather than just the individuals involved at once or directly affected.

**The Factors Influencing the Change in Chinese Media Policy**

The causal factors concerning media policy in China can be categorized into three main transitions, which are economic globalization, political decentralization and social mobilization.

Most commonly argued studies made by a number of scholars have revolved around marketization, which has been wielding tremendous influence on Chinese media change.

1. Economic globalization

On the one hand, the transnational companies (TNC) are taking every kind of effort to get into Chinese media market. They are also trying to lobby the Chinese media policy makers and regulators to be more open, responsive and preparedness to TNC’s needs. After China’s entry to WTO in 2001, these needs have turned out to be a strong urge upon Chinese government to open Chinese media market to the outside world. The globalization, concerted with commercialization and pluralization, greatly spurs the media policy in China to be more open, transparent, predictable and consistent.

“Interest in China among international media groups has surged in recent months after Beijing issued rules allowing foreign investment in joint-venture television, radio and film production companies. News Corporation, Viacom and Sony Pictures are among the big names involved in joint ventures with Chinese players”.

“Star, which operates in 58 countries, is ‘very close’ to making money in its Chinese TV business, but has suffered from regulatory restrictions that prompted Mr. Murdoch, News Corp's chairman, to complain that he had hit a ‘brick wall’ in China”.

“While Beijing has thrown open sectors such as manufacturing and retail, it has, over the past decade, granted the likes of News Corp, Viacom and AOL Time Warner only limited scope to enter what is the world's largest untapped media market”.

“I don't think it's an option to significantly reduce that investment because it's one for the future’, said Michelle Guthrie, chief executive of Star, in an interview”.
Globalization will inevitably increase pressures for political reform. It will do so because China will need more efficient and more rule-based governmental behavior in order to compete internationally.\textsuperscript{21}

On the other hand, domestic media are undertaking commercialization and local investors-private and state- are trying to persuade policy makers and regulators to give them the rein to them hoping media more independent and autonomous, media market more open and not monopolized by government. In addition, shortage of content due to the state-owned media’s incapability of production and the increasing number of media outlets due to the new technology have created more opportunities and possibilities for non-state investors to enter the media industry not only in production of content, distribution of media products, but some other services like digital channel operation as well.

One of the biggest private media companies, Enlight Media, has been very influential in media production, distribution, and advertising business. It has been the biggest entertainment program provider in China, the biggest distribution network. Its programs have been shown on nearly 300 TV stations around China, reaching 1 billion viewers. The annual total income in 2003 was $30 million.\textsuperscript{22}

Generally, “communication regulation relates to different dimensions of the communication system, that is the structure of the communication market, the market conduct of communication participants or the content of communication”.\textsuperscript{23} In the case of Chinese media policy, the government still wields strict control on media market entrance, albeit de-regulation to some extent. But “under emerging conditions, policy has generally to follow the logic of the marketplace and the technology and the wishes of consumers (and citizens) rather than impose its goals”.\textsuperscript{24}

2. Political decentralization

There have been more and more newly-born interest groups, which have been developed out of economic liberalization, in the past more than 20-year. The Chinese traditional party-state structure is also incrementally confronting challenges from those interest groups.

Along with this transition, “governance processes in China are increasingly fragmented, localized, and messy, despite continuing attempts by the central party/state to exercise some macro-control, impose unitary regulations and legislation, and maintain a central control”.\textsuperscript{25} The fragmentation is accelerating its impact on Chinese media and media policy. “A combination of administrative fragmentation, property-rights reform, and technological advance has produced a serious reduction in the Chinese central party-state’s ability to control thought work or public communications flows. Thought work has become commercialized and globalized, its sources pluralized”.\textsuperscript{26}

Among all changes in political decentralization, departmentalism and localism are the most conspicuous and critical factors.

(1) departmentalism (or sectorism), which means different sectors and departments within both party and state, between party and state, are often pursuing and protecting their own interests related to media rather than coordination. “The fragmented authority of the Chinese state encouraged a politics of bargaining between and within institutions at all levels”.\textsuperscript{27} And this has developed into an institutionalized tendency.

“This in turn motivated bureaucratic leaders to strengthen and expand their departments and to
protect departmental interests. This continues to hinder the resolution of fundamental cross-cutting issues, which require interagency cooperation. Similarly, it has hindered the development of a joined-up approach to policy making that bridges institutional divides and seek holistic solutions rather than fragmented, departmental responses”.  

The fragmentation of institutional authority makes many cases impossible in China, for instance; cross-media operations, because the media report to different government departments; cross-region reporting, because the media belong to different local governments, which do not like the media from other regions to report events happening in their own regions.

Even at the state level, broadcasting media including cable network system, microwave transmission system are owned and regulated by the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), meanwhile, telecommunications network like phone, cell phone, satellite, computer network are owned and regulated by Ministry of Information Industry (MII). Due to the structural obstacle, cable, telecommunication, computer networks have not been able to merge heretofore. And the same wide gap also exists between SARFT and the State Administration of Press and Publication, which implies it is almost impossible for print media and broadcasting media to merge, even coordinate sometimes in many cases.

(2) localism, meaning central government is facing the increasingly resistance from local governments, especially in terms of media policy implementation.

In China, “the policy recommendations are primarily addressed to the central government, but some concern provincial and local government, which play a significant role through control of some 70% of the national budget and through influence on local enterprises, judiciary systems, schools and other aspects of Chinese society”.

Chinese media at different levels and regions compete with each other in order to increase market share. In the past few year more conflicts have occurred between those growing local TV stations and China Central Television Station (CCTV), the only one national TV station. Hunan Satellite TV Channel, one of the most influential local TV station in Hunan, mid-southern China, has broadcasted a popular game show, Super Girls, a Chinese version of American Idol, via its satellite channel, which has the nationwide coverage. More than 400 million audiences in China watched the show, and many of them, in particular those junior students, got captivated by the Super Girls. They organized lots of fans clubs connected through many websites and cell phone. They even utilized cell phone to vote the final winner at the finale of the show in August, 2005. The success of the show results in increasing advertising income, which is much greater than many other CCTV’s programs, and enlarges their market share by squeezing out similar shows on CCTV.

CCTV seeks the help from SARFT and asks SARFT to send the directives to Hunan Satellite Channel trying to stop the Super Girls. The excuse they use is not the economic, business one, but the social and moral one. The directives said the Super Girls should be stopped because it has distracted too many junior students in schools from going to study at the classrooms, but going to fan websites and networking with fans around the whole China, and the show was misleading the junior generation and so forth. But Hunan Satellite Channel refuses stopping the show, saying the SARFT should pay the loss of advertisers on behalf of the Hunan Satellite Channel if the SARFT forced the show to be cancelled because Hunan has signed the contract with advertisers. And eventually Hunan wins the battle over the show, possibly temporarily notwithstanding.

We can find many various conflicts among local and state media, local government and state
government, and even media and governments. But the most convincing and ultimate excuse is the interests, in Hunan case, is the commercial interests. As a matter of fact, “parts of China’s economic success in the last twenty years have been the empowerment of provincial and local governments to experiment at their level by allowing for diversity, creating a more complex division of labor, and enabling mobility- in short, to see what works. China’s need for legitimate local government is greater than ever, because more decisions are being made at the local level”.

What we should notice is that even in media areas, “many regulatory agencies still use regulatory power as an instrument to protect and promote departmental or local interests. Such systems create rent-seeking opportunities for public officials who use their discretionary power to extract payments and other forms of ‘contributions’ from clients. Finally, a lack of transparency hinders attempts to hold agencies accountable for the delivery of public services. Many public services are provided by monopolies that do not permit citizens to realize the benefits of competition. Thus, to improve efficiency, greater efforts to reduce monopoly and increase competition are required”.

Having been looking for the solution to increasingly stronger departmentalism and localism, the state government started a transformation of government structure concerning culture and media sectors in 2005. This is one part of whole culture industry reform launched in 2003. The current transformation is to merge various government authorities originally in charge of different media, culture sectors at city and county level into one authority, which will regulate all culture-related sectors including media. And simultaneously the reform also asks to separate the government, media outlets and media companies according to their newly-positioned functions.

The ultimate goal of cultural system reform is to let government, media outlets, media companies function respectively, distinctly and separately. The government will be re-rolled as a regulator, an administrator, and a strategic planner rather than media manager and operator. The media outlets (press, journals, radio & TV stations) will be repositioned as public service units, mainly providing content service, fulfilling some productions, running advertising. The media companies will be repositioned as commercial business, which include all other businesses such as production/distribution, new media business (digital TV, mobile TV), and even other multiple businesses (non-media business).

Figure 3, The merge of government authorities
The basic idea for the restructuring and repositioning of all players concerning media and culture is to some extent coming from the establishment of Ofcom in UK. Ofcom is a new single regulator for media and telecommunications, established in the Office of Communications Act 2002, but received its full authority from the Communications Act 2003. On December 29, 2003, Ofcom inherited the duties that had previously been the responsibility of five regulatory bodies: the Broadcasting Standards Commission, the Independent Television Commission, the Office of Telecommunications (Oftel), the Radio Authority, the Radiocommunications Agency. 32

So far it is still too early to say whether the trial of downsizing and restructuring of government, media structure would definitely be a successfully ideal way to finally solve the conflicts brought about by departmentalism and localism. But it is a good experiment to integrate government agencies by identifying and limiting the function of government coupled with restructuring and clarifying the roles and lines of responsibilities of different players on media market.

“The fundamental development management challenge facing the government of China is to implement reforms of the state structure so that it is appropriate for a market economy, while at the same time maintaining both economic growth and social stability…Despite restructuring and downsizing the government, the administrative system remains highly compartmentalized. Improved coordinating mechanisms could enhance efficiency and reduce policy inconsistencies…One of the most significant challenges in the medium term will be to improve local governance capacity so that local leaders are better able to promote policies, improve resource allocation, increase investment, facilitate more efficient markets, and improve service delivery and rural living standards”. 33

3. Social mobilization

This development is the most noteworthy and significant one in China though it is still just a fledgling spring-up. The linkage between social change and media change is often neglected when analyzing Chinese media change, especially in western scholarship. The linkage “results in changes that reshape the media systems within the global context: an increasing salience of economic and market/commercial factors in the structure and media operations generally; an ongoing development in the advance of media abundance (proliferation); an internationalization of the media organization and its dispersion; an increasing technological sophistication, which affects
the production and reception of mass communication; and the media audience’s fragmentation”.  

In the wake of Chinese economic capitalization and political decentralization, “China’s centralized apparatus, which extends over such a large area, is not compatible with the dynamism of a decentralized and diverse market economy and market-based society, which depends on migration, multiple bases of power and wealth, and regional diversity. This dynamism is already putting huge strains on Chinese statecraft”.  

Economic development has been a dominant rhetoric of Chinese party-state and media since the open door policy in late 1970s. It also has become a mainstream criterion justifying the behaviors of government authority and media outlets. Not enough emphasis has ever paid to social issues though the social instability has become an obvious challenge to the regime. Efficiency in most occasions is superior to justice right now in China. But “economic growth also depends on society’s efforts, and therefore requires the state to create an enabling environment for development that encourages the participation of non-state organizations, including quasi-government, non-government, non-profit, and community-based organizations; and the private sector. Economic growth depends on a partnership between the state and society”.  

(1) new information and communication technology (ICT) brings more possibilities of access and options for Chinese audience, especially Internet and satellite, which challenges current media policy that is still control-oriented. Ignorance of these changes will undercut the solution to the problems brought about by ICT, and delay the resolution and might be accumulating the difficulties to be even harder in the long run.  

“The variables that most potently explain thought-work globalization are clearly technological. Powerful broadcast satellites, small satellite receiving dishes, automated telecommunications switching equipment, and optical-fiber transmission equipment are inherently difficult for any government to control. This point is most obvious in the Chinese state’s struggles to regulate satellite television and the Internet”.  

The government has never given up trying to regulate the new ICT, the content of websites and the Internet licensing. “In Sept. 2000, the State Council promulgated rules that sought to limit Internet content and restrict foreign investment in Internet content providers. In Nov. 2000...limited the news that web sites and online chat rooms could carry...restricted the content of online chat rooms and bulletin boards...issued lists of banned topics, including information that is pornographic or violent, spreads “feudal superstition”, endangers state security, reveals state secrets, or sabotages unity among ethnic groups...in 2001, to control Internet café’s and licensing regulations to better manage online bulletin board”.  

But the more significant phenomenon is that new media have been booming in the past several years. This booming brought about pluralization and proliferation of channels to access the alternative information which is disparate from what appears on mainstream media. Thanks to increasing popularity of alternative ways like phone, especially cell phones, Internet, it is becoming harder and harder to manipulate the flow of information (see Appendix for the number of cell phone users and online users in China). In the past two years, “the number of blogs China has mushroomed from 1,000 to 600,000”. Blogs have permeated so fast and widely so that many politically sensitive events have been posted and discussed for many years, which have been exerting lots of pressures for mainstream media and government.  

“The complex system that the Chinese government uses to control the flow of information - known as the Great Firewall - has holes. And these holes became more evident during the recent
anti-Japan protests as a complex system of text messages, blogs, online instant messages, e-mail and bulletin board systems spread word about the marches. The Chinese government and the Chinese people constantly play a cat and mouse game over the flow of information. For every new restriction and technical door that the government slams shut, the Chinese people find a hack, a workaround or an entirely new way of communicating.

The Internet was developed in a spirit of freedom and in the absence of any regulatory framework, leading to a belief in its “ungovernability”. Increasingly, however, the requirements of commerce, confidentiality and national security have challenged its freedom and the vulnerability of the Internet to control has been demonstrated.

New information and communication technology has been a driving force for media to merge across sectors and even borders. It is becoming a conspicuous challenge not only for China, but for the western countries as well. “A major underlying problem remains: especially in an increasingly technologically convergent and cross-border media environment, the question of market definition, whether at national or European level, remains fundamental”. Because of the integration of market, which will lead to the mergence of governance, how to regulate a networked market rather than a hierarchical media market is a big question, especially for China, where has a long tradition of government-structured media system. This will be more critical for Chinese media regulator to create a solution in as short time as possible along with the restructuring merge of government regulator concerning media and culture sectors.

(2) social mobilization, which implies not only social stratification related to identity and fragmentation, but geographical flow as well, is making the openness and interaction more likely rather than control in sense of social transition, particularly in the realm of media consumption and media policy making.

Social diversification due to stratification gives the birth of segmented audience and fragmented market. Diversified audience need more various media access and options, which is contradicting the homogeneity of content due to the ideological control. So that is why they seek more distinctly alternative contents from online, and international media, especially those growing middle-class, who are ascending to be the mainstream power in policy making and media consumptions. “The world's most populous country - population 1.3bn - now has about 200 million middle-class consumers. Forty per cent fall in the key 16 to 35-year-old demographic. As a result, it is attracting huge foreign investment in media and communications”.

Simultaneously social stratification to some extent leads to social polarization which means many people still live under poverty line. What they can get from the media is very poor service for marginalizing groups. “China’s inequalities are growing –income and regional. And China’s diversity is exceptional. It is a very large country with considerable disparities among regions, cities and industries. The third world coexists with the first world in China’s advanced regions”. Peripheral groups, minority groups, socially polarized groups need to be emphasized. So the SARFT named 2005 as “the Year of Public Service for Rural Areas”, whose main task is from this year on, people living in poorly rural area and urban poor family will get eight TV channels service free of charge. This could be a starting point for improving already getting worse public service for people.

As Chinese reforms have been reaching the bottleneck, which means unreformed political system and degrading public service, more social angers coming from not only the poor people, but the vested interest maintainers as well are getting much more stronger than ever before.
“Recently, many Chinese have seen their standard of living deteriorate as state-owned companies are privatized, employees are fired with little compensation and businesses begin to charge for once-free services at company-affiliated schools, hospitals and apartments. Meantime, the children of well-connected party officials are raking in money, building luxurious homes and driving around in expensive cars. This situation heightens the dissatisfaction of average citizens, so when protests begin they quickly expand to include others with different complaints”. “Zhou Yongkang, Minister of the Public Security Ministry of China, in August 2004 alerted the world to the country's heightened unrest: ‘There were 58,000 protests that [each] involved over 100 people throughout China two years ago. Last year the number rose to 74,000, and a total of 3.8 million people participated in these demonstrations.”

(3) The consciousness of civil rights is increasingly growing up and strengthening. More subculture and social rights groups strongly urge the media to be efficient vehicles for civil participation and representation.

Being paralleled with Chinese economic reform and social transition, many civil organizations such as environmental preservation, human rights, health like HIV/AIDS volunteers are also developing drastically. Coal mining accidents, Henan HIV/AIDS villages and officials’ discrimination and corruption, Sun Zhigang case (Guangzhou policemen grasped a university student, Sun Zhigang, and supposed he was a hooligan, then beat him to death) and so forth have been discussed a lot online via blogs and bbs. Those discussions have been very helpful and forceful to push the government to at least face the reality and sometimes solve the problems. In Sun Zhigang’s case, eventually the state government cancelled the detention rule, which the policemen based on.

“Although unprecedented numbers of Chinese citizens now have access to the media and the Internet, government control in these two areas continues to be tighter than in most market economies”. But in fact access to information is not only tightly related to economic growth, but also critically conducive to decision-making and efficiency of media.

In the past several years, especially after 2003, media policy making process has become a bit opener for outside public participation. In more cases compared with before, Chinese media policy makers and regulators begun to consult not only stakeholders inside the bureaucracy, but also the general public, before making policy. This is a new and welcome development. As a result public hearings, legislative hearings, and opportunities for NGOs to influence the policy process have increased in recent years. But these sorts of public participation are still limited and have many constraints. They should institutionalize the system of popular participation in policy making by requiring public hearings, opening legislative hearing, soliciting opinions, setting up advisory bodies, and consulting community groups (including NGOs).

(4) One of most exciting transition is happening to media themselves. More media are on the trajectory to follow professionalism rather than propaganda.

Partly because of the pressure from market competition to increase circulation and ratings, partly because of the ideal and responsibility of the journalists and media, more media in China right now would like to maintain as much independent and critical as possible. Nanfang Weekend, a weekly paper published in Guangzhou, is one of the most critical media in China. It has reported lots of government official corruptions without permission from governments and investigated a myriad of issues such as institution-caused or man-caused accidents, disasters, pandemics diseases and so forth, then published them such as SARS, HIV/AIDS, industrial accidents due to
corruption and etc. Historically those issues are politically sensitive. The paper has broken ice reporting them for the first time in China regardless of any directives.

In recent case of benzene pollution in Song Huajiang River in November 2005 after the explosion in a chemical plant in Jilin City, China Youth Daily, concerted with many other media in China reported the accident timely in the first several days regardless of potential orders from the state government to stop reporting and raised very critical questions for the governments there concealing the news. After several days, the government realized to wield rein on the reports again. But media have done reporting according to professional standard already, albeit in just short several days.

In China a saying describing this tactic is very popular among both media professionals and general people—border-hitting ball tactic, which is a table-tennis term, meaning the ping-pong ball just hits the border of the table, then drops down to the earth.

### Discussion as Conclusion

After examining the changes and the influential factors in Chinese media policy against the macro background, we can find the Chinese way of transition is distinct from the other transitional countries. “Gradualism, then Chinese style, meant radicalism in rural reforms, a quick opening of the economy to trade, and only gradual reform of the state enterprises. In that sense, China saved the hardest for last in the sequence of reforms”. The hardest parts are those intimately associated with political ideology and system like media and education. As for media policy reform, “a major challenge for China is deciding on the role of the state sector in social protection in the context of market reforms…In some ways, China has overshot the mark in market reforms. …in short, in the coming years China will have to build a system of social protection”.

The dilemma in Chinese media policy change is the consequence of Chinese special way of transition, especially its political logic and historical accumulation. The political ideology, the role of party and state, and the institutional structure of media are the three main factors subject to be reformed first.

What we should keep in mind is “the predominant values guiding policy in many European countries during the earlier Phase 2 (until Second World War, 1945-1980/90) were derived from ideas of freedom, equality and solidarity and policy was expected to create institutional expression of these and related values”. But it also changes, especially after 1990s. “Under emerging conditions, policy has generally to follow the logic of the marketplace and the technology and the wishes of consumers (and citizens) rather than impose its goals”.

Whether China will take new policy paradigm? It completely depends on “national circumstances, these primarily concern defining the scope and aims of any public sector in the media; the choice of policy instruments as between economic measures, regulation and self-regulation; the need to seek a coherent set of principles and a framework of regulation for all sectors; how to define and pursue any national cultural media policy; how to balance freedom of communication with the needs of society”.

In Chinese case it can be categorized into 1) party-state role; 2) commercial power; 3) the power of public interest

At least two distinct directions in terms of Chinese media policy in short-term could be likely
emerging.

One is corporatism. The political interests groups – the party and state- still play the dominant role in media policy change, but the commercial powers are ascending their influence on media policy through corporatist means.

The other is a quasi-public system under the control of government. What we should pay more attention to is the increasing of social/civil mobilization that starts to speed up the change of media policy likely towards the other direction.

1. Corporatism.

In the reform era since 1978 the Party and the state have de-regulated media business by letting them make profits through carrying advertising and doing other businesses. “In China, marketization has become a process of commercialization and, to a large extent, an instrument of government off-loading, particularly at local levels, where government finances have been under stress”.

The government satisfies itself by not only reducing the subsidies, but also and more importantly, by directing the media, at their own cost, to fulfill the political propaganda tasks. Within the deal, media are also enthusiastic about their position and power as a government organization offered by government, with which media are extremely easy to make profits. As compensation, they have to follow the empowerer’s order to carry political information and keep themselves under control in most cases. Commercial groups are playing bigger role in this process of bargaining. Both policy makers – the party and the state and policy implementers- media have already not been able to be separated with commercial groups- advertisers, and the other profits engines. “The transitional nature of the Chinese media now includes an additional authoritative feature of the market: the collaboration between the Party-state and the market for the interpenetration of political and financial interests”.

Political authorities increasingly rely on newly-growing-up business elites to support the legitimacy of the power. “The media-related party members have become increasingly more interested in the opportunities open to them for consolidating their power through economic status rather than through ideological control”.

On the other side, these business enterprises and media themselves, domestically and internationally, try to influence, lobby, get channeled into the media policy making and often help implement media policy on the government’s behalf.

It has become very obvious that dominant political powers, decentralized notwithstanding, would corporate with less powerful, but incrementally enhancing commercial interests groups in media policy making and regulation.

But this kind of corporatism quite often confronts sudden one-step back of the government. Because it is not the media policy maker’s wish to really open to commercial enterprises, private and state, domestic and international. In many cases, a bit openness to those outside commercial groups could be regarded as sorts of tokenism, be viewed as “a political-fashion-inspired conviction, what has been called an ‘in vogue mantra’”.

“This year, officials have even been backtracking from a planned cautious opening of the TV production business to foreign investment, citing concerns over "national cultural security."

Mr. Murdoch surprised media watchers in September when he appeared to abandon a long-standing charm offensive in Beijing and publicly accused the Chinese authorities of being ‘paranoid’ about the foreign media.
We were hoping that there would be deregulation allowing 51-49 joint ventures in co-production of programming, but it appears in the short-term, we and other multinational media companies won't be able to take advantage of that,’ said Michelle Guthrie, chief executive of Star”.

Although it is a one-step back happened this year, there is a strong reality for government and commercial powers to be hand in hand to sustain mutually-legitimating relationship. But it will tend to inevitably undermine such social values as justice, fairness, equity and equality. Even economic development also “depends on the combined efforts of the government, NGOs and the private sectors. The government (in China) has recognized the important contributions of the private sector to sustainable economic growth, but in many respects the bias toward state-owned property and the public sector remains and the private sector continues to suffer from many problems… the government should redouble its efforts to focus on its new role as a service provider to both public and private entrepreneurs”.

2, A quasi-public system under the control of government
Since the culture industry reform was launched in 2003, especially due to its policy splitting the media into two different sectors – public service and commercial ones, many debates about the public service and its system in China have been initiated. Social upheaval would be possible at any time and any cause. It has been the first concern for the Party and the state that social stability should be maintained at any cost. But it would not be able to be achieved unless there would come to relative balance and consensus, at least compromise among political, commercial and public interests.

It is really a long march again for the Chinese government to reach the balance or compromise as there are so many endogenous and exogenous variables. In terms of endogenous difficulties, never does China have a history of public service system of media though there were and are some other public service systems on the one hand, and on the other hand, the prior public service systems such as public health system are being ruined due to the commercialization. As far as exogenous variables concerned, “the concept of a citizenship-serving, public service role for the media, underpinned by legislation and active regulation, has been weakened both by the pressure of market forces and the surrender to them by a string of ideologically non-interventionist governments”. “Though isolated features of public interest regulation will remain, they will now be the exception to the dominant market forces, reversing the traditions of twentieth-century regulation of broadcasting in Western Europe, and leaving key aspects of democracy under severe threat”.

Even if both traditional Western European public service system and Chinese yet-to-change media system are meeting the challenges from those pressures, “the main goal of any communications policy can be described as that of securing the free and equal access to a social communications system that diversely provides for the information and communication needs in society. In a context of technological convergence and increasing market competition, communications policies are likely to be primarily policy for access”. The availability of diverse access and information is in central to better decision making by citizens and consumers, and it is also a crucial determinant of the efficiency of political and economic markets.

Enlightened by Chinese economic reform, many local governments concerning media and culture in China “have adopted new and innovative public service delivery systems that have
included contracting out, franchising, and privatization, but many public services are provided by monopolies that do not permit citizens to realize the benefits of competition. Thus, to improve efficiency, greater efforts to reduce monopoly and increase competition are required. So the alternative option for Chinese media policy and system will likely be a quasi-public media system under the control of government. It should provide more open access and public sphere so as to empower the public to participate and represent their interests. It would be conducive to consolidate the legitimacy of the political power. Efficiency, good administration and a certain concept of public service can be the hallmarks of the system.

The Asian Development Bank advises Chinese government in 2002 to focus on four principles of governance policy. They are transparency of operations, accountability, predictability, and participation. “Perhaps the most difficult recommendations are the proposed change of the role of the government, and the establishment of a clear rule of law.”

Just as the gradualism way of Chinese economic reform in the past more than 20 years, the transition of Chinese media policy and system “cannot happen overnight. They require a change of mindset that may not be consistent with past ideology and practice. And there is a delicate balance to be achieved. Moving too fast could risk social and political stability because of the adjustment costs. But moving too slowly could cause social instability due to the pressure” coming from internal and external factors.

“There is thus no readymade solution. China should look at the experiences of other countries and adapt them to its context. China will have to find its own way of resolving the tensions and contradictions of moving from its past legacy to respond to the new demands.”
### Appendix:

Table 1: Number of fixed-line phone subscribers in China, 1978-2004

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Table 2: Number of mobile phone subscribers in China, 1988-2004

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<td>2004</td>
<td>334.824</td>
<td>24.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Endnotes:


5 ibid, 183


11 ibid & Time Warner’s data is from its annual report.


ibid, 60


the data can be found at the website of Enlight Media, retrieved from http://home.netandtv.com/address/address_jianjie.htm.


ibid, 92


ibid, 165-6


ibid, 201-2


This argument can be found in publications: Simons, Henry (1948) Economic Policy of a Free Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Stigler, George (1961) ‘The Economics of


69 ibid, 15
Reference:


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Biography:

Dr. Zhengrong Hu is Professor of Communication and Director of the National Center for Radio & TV Studies. He also serves as the Executive Dean of the Graduate School Communication University of China. Professor Hu research areas are media policy and institutional transition, media development strategy, media management, and political economy of communication.

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