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**INTRODUCTION**

Launched in 2001, the Milton Wolf Seminar Series aims to deal with developing issues in diplomacy and journalism – both broadly defined. Using case studies such as Hungary, Iran, Syria, Egypt, and Tunisia, the 2012 Milton Wolf Seminar, *Transitions Transformed: Ideas of Information and Democracy Post-2011* explored the evolving relationship between media and democratic transition in light of rapid technological change and the shifting structure and dynamics of the international communication system. As countries such as Tunisia and Egypt move towards democratic transition and countries such as Hungary adopt new laws and policies that threaten to undermine democratic practices, considerable debate abounds about the future structure of democratic institutions and the role of media and communication structures, practices, and regulations. The 2012 Milton Wolf Seminar participants participated in two and a half days of intense consideration of the current and potential role of the media, diplomats, and activists in facilitating positive outcomes. Panelists and discussion concentrated on such issues as: the tension between information rights and national sovereignty, state sponsorship and promotion of internet circumvention technologies, the role of social media in the Arab Spring, and responses within the European Union to Hungary's controversial 2010 Media Laws.

In lieu of one report chronicling the seminar, this year, the organizers asked each of the eight 2012 Milton Wolf Seminar Distinguished Emerging Scholar Delegates to write critical reaction pieces to the seminar discussions. This was the inaugural year for the Milton Wolf Emerging Scholars Programme. The chosen delegates represent a diverse array of outstanding postdoctoral fellows, PhD students, and advanced MA candidates currently involved in academic studies related to the seminar themes. These delegates were chosen from an elite pool of applicants nominated by their home institutions and received full funding to attend the Seminar.

Their reaction pieces highlight the major debates, conclusions, and lingering questions raised during the seminar. With particular attention to China, **Rogier Creemers** (p. 3-7) considers how the internet has challenged traditional Westphalian notions of national sovereignty. Reflecting on Session 4 of the Seminar, which featured a debate about the implications of the 2010 Hungarian Media Law for the European Union, **Endre Dányi** (p. 8-11) explores how the internet has challenged and expanded the physical and metaphorical architecture of democracy. Drawing upon discussions about information rights and national sovereignty, **Harriet Di Francesco** (p. 12-15) argues that the current system of internet governance privileges corporations and states rather than individuals and civil society. In a complementary piece, **Leshuo Dong** (p. 16-18) questions whether we can assume that multilateral and distributed systems of governance and policy making necessarily prevent different political and corporate actors from asserting more control over the Internet. **Shalini Iyengar** (p. 19-21) reflects upon the evolving relationship between
media and democracy as highlighted by different discussions and case studies explored during the Seminar. Focusing on social media, Marissa Moran (p. 22-25) discusses shifts in how states are utilizing information flows to exert soft power. Roy Revie (p. 26-30) critiques the American “internet freedom agenda,” arguing that it obscures the continuingly robust power of states online. Last but not least, Sandra Ristovska (p.31-33) explores how government, corporate, and civil society actors use both aspirational and factual terms to construct narratives about internet freedom that influence internet governance.

The 2012 seminar was jointly organized by the Center for Global Communication Studies (CGCS) at the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication, The American Austrian Foundation (AAF), and the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna (DA). Guests include those working for state and multilateral organizations, journalists, media development practitioners, academics, and a select group of highly engaged graduate students interested in the seminar themes. More information about the seminar, speakers, agenda, and organizers is included at the close of this document.
THE INTERNET, SOFT WAR, SOVEREIGNTY, AND CHINA
By Rogier Creemers

Conflicting approaches are emerging in the basic concept of internet regulation. On the one hand, the approach of openness, reflected in recent US policy statements, aims for an internationally open internet with minimal state interference. On the other hand, the internet sovereignty-approach championed by China advocates for a geographical approach to internet management, subject to localized control by states. This conflict can be considered as one manifestation of the historical tension between substantive international norms and the acceptance of regional limitations or sovereignty, further explored in this post.

In the autumn of 1648, delegations of nearly all rulers of the European continent came together in the German city of Münster to bring an end to two simultaneous wars that had ravaged the continent for decades. The treaties they negotiated became collectively known as the Peace of Westphalia, a watershed in the political organization of Europe. To bring an end to religious war, they postulated the notion of sovereignty, which emphasized the right of the ruler to decide the religion of their territories (cuius regio, eius religio), the notion of State supremacy over the church, and the inviolability of territorial borders. In confirming the principle of non-intervention, the Peace of Westphalia, can in fact be considered an agreement to disagree. In other words, the objective of sovereignty was to enable sovereign rulers to pursue their own domestic politics without fear of foreign interference or invasion.

Over the next centuries, conflicts over ideology slowly supplanted religious conflicts as the dominant cause of international strife, culminating in the horrors of the Second World War. The post-war peace process, in turn, stimulated the further internationalization of norms surrounding the natural rights of man, which had gradually been gaining popularity since the 1789 French Revolution. This led to the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 by jurists from different legal traditions from all over the world. The norms contained in this document claim to be universally applicable. Prima facie, it would seem that this universalism conflicts with the notion of sovereignty, which had largely kept normative claims outside of the realm of international law. To a certain extent, this criticism can be mitigated by the fact that the broad drafting of the UDHR permits certain latitudes in interpreting the content of the rights without derogating from their basic premise. Both in the United States and the European Union, for example, the right to freedom of expression is recognized as a cornerstone of the liberal-democratic structure of the state. These jurisdictions, however, differ considerably in their interpretation of the scope of that right, its relationship to other civil and political rights, and the methodology through which the defense of those rights is tested in courts.

In the internet era, we observe a similar tension between conceptions of sovereignty and international norms related to the natural rights of man. Internet and mobile technology has connected the world in ways that were hitherto impossible. It has sped up flows of commerce and personal interactions, but also of ideas and culture, both within and
between countries. At the same time, regimes all over the world have become concerned about the way that the internet may facilitate challenges to state legitimacy and authority. While authoritarian regimes, such as China, Iran or Cuba are more closely associated with strict internet controls, recent legal proceedings in the United States and the United Kingdom have also proposed stricter controls over internet communication. While some interventions in the online sphere may be justified as means of safeguarding the lawful rights and interests of citizens, the global nature of the internet, often mentioned in one breath with the idea of international norms of governance, conflicts with the notion of national sovereignty and its implied concept of self-determination.

In effect, we are faced with a similar question to the one that the delegations tackled in Münster. As the virtual world increasingly overlaps with the real world, how are we to structure its governance? To date, the codes of openness and resistance to government intervention that exist among the computer-savvy communities that launched the internet in the nineties have heavily influenced internet regulation. Complex questions of governance have come to the fore, however, as the number of internet users has grown; speed, storage and complexity have increased; and the potential damage that can be inflicted through the network has expanded into the domains of terrorism, risk to state secrets, technological espionage, and so on.

The fundamental question is how to reconcile normative standards, based in human rights concepts, with the procedural safeguards that are present in the concept of sovereignty, which may also protect certain normative standards. In other words: if one were tasked with writing the World Internet Treaty, how would you reconcile demands for state control over the internet with principles such as the right to free speech and to receive and impart information? This task becomes further complicated when we recognize that authoritarian regimes such as the Chinese Party-State use exactly the same terminology. But going even further, if internet governance is to be based on traditional intergovernmental treaty methods and notions of state sovereignty, how should we deal with internet-based conflicts? In other words, when does a state action become an act of war, if committed electronically? While few would disagree that a Chinese bombing of the Pentagon would constitute a *casus belli*, how would an electronic attack on the Pentagon communications system or an attempted break-in to its secure information systems be considered? What sort of retaliatory action would be legitimate? Should we equate hostile acts in the virtual realm with those in the real world?

In the Chinese context, these questions are less arcane than they may seem at first sight. Chinese foreign policy is steeped in the Realist tradition. During the last century and a half, China was humiliated by wars with and invasions by Western powers and Japan. Its Communist alliance with the Soviet Union broke apart ten years after the establishment of the People’s Republic; and China’s accession to international organizations such as the UN and the WTO were protracted and difficult affairs. As a result, China’s international agenda is squarely centered on the concomitant goals of strengthening national economic development and its political autonomy. China’s official doctrine of peaceful development states that it will not seek regional or global hegemony but rather aim to be a responsible member of the global system. This doctrine, however, is based on classical notions of
sovereignty. The Chinese government wants to pursue its own domestic agenda without interference from foreign parties. International cooperation and activity is to be managed by the government, as opposed to private parties, and many parts of international politics are considered to be zero-sum games.

Culture and media (including the internet) are areas in which China’s overarching belief in the primacy of national sovereignty is particularly clear. Since the mid-2000s, Chinese policy documents have increasingly utilized the term “national cultural security” (guojia wenhua anquan 国家文化安全). While this term, like many other Chinese policy terms, is generally not explained in great detail, its use illustrates China’s position vis-à-vis foreign cultural influences. Among the first central party and government documents to utilize the term, were those regarding: combatting the import of obscene and pornographic works, cleaning up the internet gaming environment, foreign capital investment in the cultural sector, and attacking illegally imported foreign audio-visual products. In the aftermath of the fall of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the USSR, Chinese leadership became increasingly suspicious of foreign cultural influence. They posited that these regimes fell, at least in part, due to Western support of dissidents and cultural products aimed at destabilizing state power. A recent remark by President Hu illustrates that these concerns are alive and well today:

Hostile foreign powers are intensifying strategies and plots to Westernize and divide our country; the ideological and cultural sphere is the focus sphere in which they conduct long-term infiltration. We must deeply recognize the gravity and complexity of struggle in the ideological domain, ring the alarm bell, be on a long-term guard, adopt forceful measures to be on guard and react.

A policy document on strengthening cultural reform, released in February, similarly stated that,

Facing the new situation of the accelerated development of modern information technology and dissemination methods, the task of accelerating the construction of cultural innovation systems and moving cultural innovation forward has become even more pressing. Facing the new situation of the exchange, blending and confrontation of all sorts of ideology and culture at the global level becoming even more clear, and the fight having become more acute and complex, the task of strengthening our country’s comprehensive cultural strength and international influence, resisting the force of international hostile forces’ cultural infiltration and safeguarding national cultural security has become even more pressing.
As a response, a steady stream of Chinese policy documents have advocated for the creation of a strong Chinese media and communications industry, with the aim of strengthening China’s soft power. However, the increasing militarized tone of many of these policy statements seems to indicate that another useful concept might be that of “soft war,” as elaborated at the first session of the Milton Wolf Seminar. Soft war is a useful concept for study and research for two reasons. First, as a framework for analysis, soft power focuses on occasions when states rely on attraction and persuasion as opposed to hard power methods in order to achieve international relations goals. Soft war, as opposed to soft power, may be useful for theorizing an environment in which relationships are primarily antagonistic, but largely divorced from hard power conflict. Second, as a political tactic, political actors’ active pursuit of soft war strategies can be analyzed in Clausewitzian ways: is soft war a continuation of public diplomacy by other means?

From the Chinese perspective, soft war on the internet increasingly seems to consist of a broad spectrum of measures, including the creation of a nationalist narrative and the monopolization of public information, but also cyber-attacks against foreign enterprises and institutions. Through these efforts, the Chinese government defends Chinese national interests, and thereby, its sovereignty. While it is much too early to start using terms such as a “soft arms race,” escalating soft war efforts may frustrate relationships in other fields or escalate political tensions. At the same time, the current mode of internet governance (or any other form of media governance, for that matter) does not address the tensions between universal internet rights and national sovereignty. It would therefore seem that measures aimed at defusing some of these tensions need to mitigate China’s concerns about national cultural security. Recognizing the value of sovereignty in the internet sphere, China launched the concept of internet sovereignty. This would inevitably mean that the universalist claims of international norms of internet and media freedom would be limited. The sobering conclusion may be that perhaps the most that is possible for now is, like the Peace of Westphalia, to come to a gentlemen’s agreement; to disagree on content or substance, but to agree about forms and procedures of cooperation, and to do so peacefully.

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THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY

By Endre Dányi

In one of the most fascinating panels at this year’s Milton Wolf Seminar, an important distinction was made between two particular conceptualizations of the internet. According to the first one, the internet should be thought of as a tool or an instrument; whereas according to the second one, it should be conceived of as the extension of a public place where people can gather. In this short reaction piece I would like to take this distinction as my point of departure. I will argue that if we are indeed witnessing a shift, as some participants of the panel claimed, from an instrumental to a spatial understanding of the internet and other media technologies, then there is a pressing need to examine how public places are being regulated—not by abstract user manuals—but by the very architecture of democracy.

This proposed turn to architecture is not new. Ever since Michel Foucault used Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon1—an imaginary prison that looks surprisingly similar to Vienna’s Narrenturm, Europe’s first psychiatric hospital—to demonstrate the subtle, seemingly invisible mechanisms of disciplinary power, all sorts of buildings have been used as methodological devices for the socio-cultural analysis of modernity.2 Sociologists of science have entered laboratories, hospitals, and high-tech innovation centers in order to examine how scientific knowledge is made and put to use. Social anthropologists and cultural historians have analyzed everyday practices associated with museums and archives to describe how art and history are organized. Economic sociologists have scrutinized both physical and virtual markets in order to explain the evolution of the global economy.3 Interestingly, however, there have been few studies that use buildings as a focal point through which to explore the nuances of democratic politics. Town halls, party headquarters, ministries and parliaments are almost entirely missing from the list of common ethnographic sites. The lack of parliaments is particularly striking, since most European and North American legislatures are very strongly associated with their physical locations. Just think of the Palace of Westminster, the U.S. Capitol, the renovated Reichstag,

* I would like to thank the organisers of the 2012 Milton Wolf Seminar, especially Professor Monroe Price, for inviting me to Vienna, and making it possible for me to attend and participate in the discussions.

2 Michel Foucault (1979). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (A. Sheridan, Trans.). Harmondsworth: Penguin. For more information on the Narrenturm (Fool’s Tower), see http://www.narrenturm.at/ [last accessed on 10 April 2012].
the Assemblée Nationale, or the Austrian Parliament. If, as Claude Lefort famously asserted, the locus of power in a democratic setting is really an empty place, then why do we need such imposing and visibly singular shells around it?4

What could we learn if—following in the footsteps of Michael Foucault and the sociologists of science, art, and economy—we tried to understand democracy not against the background of, but through its architecture? These were some of the questions that guided my PhD project, which was a combination of historical and ethnographic research about the Hungarian Parliament.5 I chose the Hungarian Parliament, not only because, as a Hungarian citizen, I had better chances of securing access to my field site than anywhere else, but also because the paradox I mentioned above is probably nowhere more apparent than in Budapest. The parliament building, which at the time of its opening in 1902 was the largest and one of the most impressive of its kind, is simultaneously older and younger than Hungarian democracy. It was built fifty years after the first democratic election in Hungary and a hundred years before the country became a fully functioning, independent republic. As such, the physical home of the Hungarian legislature actively resists the idea that democracy in Hungary (and in other Central and Eastern European countries) began in 1989. Instead, this more than a century old building portrays democracy as a historically and culturally specific development that began sometime in the end of the 18th century, and took a hundred years to institutionalize.6

This, in itself, is not very surprising; but the Hungarian Parliament, a huge neo-Gothic palace on the East bank of the Danube, also provides clues about the less tangible processes of constructing a democracy. One of the main purposes of the Hungarian parliament building was to demonstrate the existence of a Hungarian political community within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (a political formation that lasted until 1918). While the classical Austrian parliament building was meant to be the manifestation of universal values and ideas, its Hungarian counterpart was supposed to emphasize the uniqueness of the Hungarian people and their thousand-year-old state. This is the reason why the building and its interiors are full of historical references to medieval princes, kings, and queens; this is also the reason why the royal jewels (including the Holy Crown) are on display in the Cupola Hall of Parliament, making it the single most popular tourist attraction in Hungary.7

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5 The research itself, funded by The Leverhulme Trust, which was part of a larger project called “Relocating Innovation: Places and Material Practices of Future Making.” For more information, see http://www.sand14.com/relocatinginnovation/ [last accessed on 10 April 2012].
Clearly, there is no democracy without demos; and, in this sense, a parliament building can be seen as a monument or a memorial to (a well-defined group of) people. But a parliament building is also the home of a legislature, the only political institution that has the right to create and modify laws, and, as such, it has to meet certain architectural requirements. Unlike Bentham’s Panopticon, which was envisioned as an oval structure with an invisible center and an outer layer of transparent rooms, in a parliament building, it is the political center that has to be fully transparent to the public, while the public is kindly asked to remain as invisible as possible. At the time when the Hungarian Parliament was constructed, transparency was achieved in two ways. On the one hand, all plenary sittings of the National Assembly were openly accessible, and so were usually attended by large groups of citizens and journalists. On the other hand, thanks to highly skilled shorthand writers, all political debates were quickly transcribed and published in the official Parliamentary journals. Although the dominant media technologies have changed, this is still the case today; all plenary sittings are broadcast and archived on the Parliament’s official website.

There is no doubt that political debates have to be visible in a democratic setting. But why does the public have to be invisible at the same time? Why can citizens attend and listen, but not speak in plenary sittings? Does democracy not mean the kratos (rule) of the demos? Well, it does; but in contemporary democracies this rule is mostly practiced through elected representatives. The first Hungarian democratic election took place in 1848, soon after the outbreak of the anti-Habsburg revolution. The setting up of the revolutionary government marked the beginning of professional politics in Hungary. For the first time, members of the National Assembly could take part in politics not because of their wealth or family connections, but because of the authority that was granted to them by the people. As representatives, their task was to represent the people’s interests according to their conscience. If representatives failed to adequately represent the people’s interests, they could not be called back, as was the case prior to 1848, but had to be replaced by other representatives at a subsequent election. What Claude Lefort means when he says the locus of power in a democracy is an empty place is that the place identified as the symbolic core of democratic politics is supposed to remain constant, while politicians come and go.

The construction of the Hungarian Parliament took almost twenty years; but despite the best-laid plans of the architect Imre Steindl, the building at the symbolic core of democratic politics went through several transformations. In the first hundred years of its existence, the “House of the Nation” witnessed two world wars and three revolutions. As a result, hardly anything that was cast in stone during the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy remains today. In the words of writer Lajos Parti Nagy, in the beginning of the 21st century the parliament building looks like “an ‘in-the-meantime’ disproportionate monster, designed for a different, earlier country.”

It is tempting to think of the post-1989 period as a second


8 My translation. For the original blog entry of Lajos Parti Nagy see http://ittvan.blog.hu/2007/09/28/parti_nagy_lajos_a_parlament_ha_targy [last accessed on 27 April 2012].
chance to complete the architecture of democracy in Hungary, but what I have tried to show in this piece is the necessary incompleteness of that architecture.

Incompleteness is not the weakness, but the quite possibly the greatest strength of the architecture of democracy. The widespread use of the internet and other media technologies are powerful indicators of what I mean by this. The internet and media technologies can make the boundaries between politicians and the demos more porous and more distributed, turning seemingly local issues like the 2010 Hungarian Media Law into international controversies in a very short period of time. They can problematize the notion of transparency in democratic politics (as in the case of the WikiLeaks). Equally importantly, they can challenge conventional notions of political participation, as they did during the 2011 demonstrations and uprisings in the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere. To paraphrase a wise comment of one of the participants at this year’s Milton Wolf Seminar, the important question is not whether we like all these changes or not, but whether we are willing to engage in an ongoing dialogue about them.

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THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTERNET FREEDOM
By Harriet Di Francesco

During the first session of the 2012 Milton Wolf Seminar, former Austrian ambassador and current director of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, Dr. Hans Winkler, asked the question, “Has the Westphalian notion of sovereignty disappeared?” He stressed that, when discussing information rights and national sovereignty, we must ask ourselves, “where does one right end and another begin?” These questions have a particular resonance for a student of international relations and law such as myself. For me, the debate over internet freedom and governance is a mere footnote in a perpetual battle of ideas about state sovereignty and the individual rights. During the Seminar, representatives of both state and society (government officials, journalists, and academics) put forward their assessments and offered solutions to several current quandaries: Does the internet represent a public space to all; and, if it does, to what extent can governments regulate that space? Can fundamental human rights, the right to free speech, expression, and assembly, be applied to the internet? And if so, how do they apply to this space?

Whilst the seminar participants did not reach a general consensus on these issues, most agreed that states continue to exert influence in cyber space. Participants pointed towards examples of state influence over the internet such as: Iranian and Chinese uses of internet filtering technologies, Western sponsorship of circumvention technologies designed to evade these filters, and the prosecution of organizations like Wikileaks by states like the United States, United Kingdom, and Sweden. My conclusion is that the Westphalian notion of sovereignty has not disappeared and, despite techno-utopian claims to the contrary, the rise of social media has not significantly undermined the role of the state in restricting or enhancing individual human rights of expression and assembly. Nowhere is this more evident than in the recent political crusade to protect and promote freedom on the Internet and the international implications of that this may have.

In January 2010 and December 2011, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered high profile speeches on internet freedom, the first in Washington D.C. and the second at The Hague. On both occasions, Clinton endorsed a campaign to defend and advance the fundamental freedoms of everyone, everywhere, including online. She condemned various countries for assaulting this freedom and asserted the rights of individuals to express themselves and freely associate in all public spheres, saying,

the right to express one’s views, practice one’s faith, peacefully assemble with others to pursue political or social change – these are all rights to which all human beings are entitled, whether they choose to exercise them in a city square or an internet chat room.

For Clinton, current mechanisms of internet governance—that is, governance by a combination of government, private sector, and civil society actors—supports the free flow of information and provides a means for freedom of expression. Countries that challenge this system not only violate human rights, but also create national barriers in cyberspace.
that undermine the global marketplace of ideas. One Seminar speaker reasserted that the current US policy is to foster this multi-stakeholder governance. “As a space,” she said, “[the internet] is analogous to the offline world, the same rules, laws, and principles apply.” According to the speaker, a “tool-based model” of the Internet, that is, a means through which governments can assert control, inevitably presupposes the suppression of individual freedom online. The fundamental problem with this argument is that the current multi-stakeholder internet governance approach does not always ensure the free flow of information, nor does it effectively ensure freedom of expression across borders. In fact, it often privileges states and corporations over individuals.

Current governance in many ways privileges internet corporations over individuals when it comes to their ability to shape how and what information flows across and within borders. Whilst social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter provide avenues for individual expression, they also make more private information public. For the purposes of profit-maximization, corporations customize more and more of the Internet experience without the users’ consent. In other words, these corporations have disproportionate influence over the conditions through which end users seek and impart information over the Internet. Examples of this include: targeted advertising, a Facebook identity that “travels” with users even after they leave the site, and a Google search database that memorizes and organizes search histories. Furthermore, major social networking sites set their own guidelines and restrictions about what can and cannot be published online. They have the power to remove anything that is deemed objectionable, obscene, pornographic, or defamatory. On a basic level, the Internet is not a public space at all, but, increasingly, a patchwork of private and corporate interests that seek to profit from the management of users’ information.

Governments are thus able to outsource the process of internet regulation by lending the responsibility to these private web service providers. This practice was described by Robert Faris, Research Director of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University: “Because legal processes on an Internet scale are so difficult, if not impossible,” Faris said, “we see a retreat to the informal, that is, blocking and restriction.” Faris, whose recent research includes Internet content regulation, state censorship, and surveillance practices, argued that all countries recognize that there is no absolute freedom on the Internet and engage in some form of regulation. Because political processes are contingent upon a variety of social and cultural elements within countries, there are significant differences in sensitivities and standards across borders. Thus, it is extremely difficult to imagine a single, shared cyber space accepted by all communities and their governments.

Nowhere is the continuing relevance of Westphalian notions of internet sovereignty more clear than in the area of cybersecurity. The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA), currently under review in the US House of Representatives, proposes to codify government rights to information and surveillance of online activity as a means for tackling “cybercrime.” The proposed bill would make it easier for the US government and private companies to share information about cybersecurity threats. It does not, however, establish any limits on the type of information that can be shared or specify the appropriate uses of that information. Rather, it clearly exonerates companies from any liability for handing over private information to government agencies. CISPA threatens to give the US
government unprecedented powers to gather citizen information while overriding existing privacy legislation.

Privacy is another area that demonstrates the difference between the rhetoric and the reality of the US government position on Internet freedom. Despite promoting individual rights online, the US State Department has engaged in extensive espionage on citizens and other political figures via the Internet. The most recent and well-known evidence of this are contained within the Wikileaks documents released in July 2009. Hillary Clinton herself ordered State Department employees to gather biometric information on the UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, and other leading diplomats. In 2010, another cable released via Wikileaks revealed that the State Department sought to protect Bush administration officials facing criminal investigation in Spain for permitting the torture of terrorist suspects. Rather than addressing this corruption on behalf of the world’s most powerful state actors, the US Department of Justice dealt with this by convening a grand jury in 2011 to investigate Julian Assange and Wikileaks’s role in leaking classified diplomatic and military documents. The State Department also pressured Visa, Paypal, and other major online payment companies to freeze all Wikileaks accounts and Amazon and other US-based ISPs to refuse to host Wikileaks sites. Furthermore, American Wikileaks activists have since been repeatedly harassed, detained at airports, and had their electronic possessions confiscated without the use of a warrant. What is striking about these examples is the fact that, despite fostering “multi-stakeholder governance” in favor of a “tool-based model,” the Internet continues to provide a means through which governments, even those that actively preach otherwise, can reassert their control and regulate social activity.

There doesn’t appear to be much hope for change, either. The Obama administration continues to prevent, as best it can, access to and discussion about the disclosed WikiLeaks documents. The State Department has warned students of international relations intending to apply for jobs in the federal government that posting WikiLeaks links on social media sites such as Facebook or Twitter would appear as a black mark on their security clearance checks. Federal employees are not allowed to access the documents and the Library of Congress, the largest in the world, has blocked access to them from their computers. It is naïve, therefore, to think that only specific countries (“authoritarian” ones) utilize the Internet to consolidate state power.

In recent years, censorship in some countries has expanded, at least in part, in reaction to the threat of American hegemony in the Internet, media, and cultural sphere. Since the 2011 Freedom Online Conference, governments such as Iran, China, Russia, and Turkey, have become more vocal in their fears that the United States is exploiting its dominance of cyberspace in order to promote its own political agenda. They have continued to bolster their domestic internet enterprises at the expense of foreign competitors. In 2009, Turkey launched an effort to create “the Anaposta,” a national filtered search engine that blocked over 20,000 sites. Iran followed in 2010 by banning Gmail and announcing its own national e-mail system. In the same year, Russia also announced plans to establish a national e-mail and, in 2011, announced plans to develop a national search engine service. Thus, fresh
attempts to prevent the fragmentation of a global cyberspace may in fact hasten the erection of barriers around national lines.

So what does the future hold for internet freedom? From a purely political perspective, any international effort to liberalize the Internet must be led by America, the biggest single force shaping the actions of other states. Clinton’s speech was highly ambitious and idealistic, but also dangerously hypocritical. This hubris has destroyed any credibility in American claims to protect individual rights online, especially from the point of view of potential rivals and other less-than-friendly governments to the US. The fact that other countries have sought to create national search engines to compete with privately-owned American companies like Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft, underscores the impotence of a US-led initiative to open up cyberspace. Personally, I think that it is unrealistic to expect that governments will scale back the regulation and control of the Internet on a global scale. Thus, the current US foreign policy will continue to face challenges that it itself has helped to create.

About the Author

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Harriet Di Francesco is a Masters student at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Bologna. Studying International Relations, Harriet has chosen courses with a strong emphasis on economics and law. In a recent research paper, Harriet explored the paradox between traditional forms of international justice and the cosmopolitan idea that individuals are moral and legal subjects in a global civil society. She is fundamentally interested in the central notions and ideas behind theories of international politics and the ways in which these can be applied to the real world.
INFORMATION SPACE POWER AND EMPOWERMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD

By Leshuo Dong

This year’s Milton Wolf Seminar, with its theme, “Transitions Transformed: Ideas of Information and Democracy Post-2011,” brought us all together to think about how the governance of information space shifts global power dynamics. Participants from all over the world discussed internet regulation, media law cases, and media development in a global context. Across the range of case studies—from consideration of media and information consumption patterns in Iran, to the lessons of the Arab Spring, to American government notions of internet freedom, to China’s declaration of internet sovereignty—I was struck by the current and potential power that information flows have to transform global power dynamics, particularly as domestic debates about the governance of informational space are increasingly conducted under the global spotlight.

As highlighted during the seminar discussions, especially in the session entitled “The International Political Economy of the Internet: Technologies of Freedom and Technologies of Control,” there are intense debates regarding what players and what principles should govern domestic and international informational spaces. While the Internet was invented in the United States, its increasing popularity and importance prompt international discussions that could have significant repercussions for its future evolution. The development and application of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that shape the regulation and use of the Internet are at the center of these ongoing debates. According to my understandings and observations, critical questions that were raised during the Milton Wolf Seminar presentations and discussions were:

- Does the Internet need a global regulator?
- Will there be a set of globally accepted principles related to internet governance?
- And what should be the most important elements of this possible global commons?

To think about these questions, we must consider several dimensions of power and empowerment in the informational space. First, some states are attempting to transport the traditional power that they wield over “old media” technologies like radio, TV, or telecom to the Internet. In the short term, however, there’s no way that any government could “take over the Internet.” Not only is this technically impossible, but the Internet’s culture is too decentralized for any single power to effectively take control. Nonetheless, we should be aware that many countries across the globe are hoping to gain a greater power over how the Internet operates. Some are trying to retain the dominant position that they held over telecom and broadcast media regulation. Others claim that security concerns necessitate that they exert similar control over the Internet.

Some governments are accused of fearing that open information flows will lead to regime change or at least threaten to their rule; other governments seek to protect their information spaces out of calls for populism, nationalism, or trade protectionism, etc. However, to discern the influence of political power on internet governance, we need more
systematic analysis on why and how governmental proposals to replace the Internet’s decentralized and open system should be resisted. Current multilateral systems of internet governance are facing problems. It seems that there is no unity or cohesion among the actors who oppose state efforts to increase control over the Internet through regulation and governance. Another concern is that many of those who oppose more government internet regulation do not present a viable alternative. A collaborative spirit regarding the Internet is easier said than done. While many actors promote multi-stakeholder internet regulation, which refers to the process of bringing together diverse players and ensuring they have a voice in policy making process, the rhetoric is far from the reality. The problem is that multi-stakeholder approaches might be a helpful during the policy negotiations process, but the outcome cannot be ensured. In other words, multi-stakeholder policymaking doesn’t ensure that the agreed-upon principles or policies will prevent different political and corporate actors from asserting more control over the Internet.

Many of the seminar discussions focused on how different political actors exert influence over the governance of informational space; corporate control was not as big a focal point during the seminar. Despite the widespread benefits of cross-border data flows to economic growth, in the past decade people have begun to worry about how to ensure that the international market for ICT is fair and contestable. Technically, broadband providers have the ability to block internet service, applications, and content; telephone or cable companies are also able to slow down competing or undesired content. Hence new media companies, including Amazon and Google, as well as public interest groups have raised calls for "network neutrality." But does "neutrality" adequately address more fundamental changes that broadband and cable monopolies are seeking in their quest to monetize the Internet? If not, how should we prevent the Internet from becoming a medium that functions solely as a marketing tool of commercial institutions, and not as a relay of civic-related communications? It is critical for businesses around the world that electronic goods and services move across borders as freely as possible; but without proactive intervention from the public, the international rules governing flows of digital goods, services, data and infrastructure are incomplete because they don’t necessarily serve the values and issues that we should care about, like civil rights.

The issues discussed above are enough to serve as a wake-up call for the world’s two billion plus Internet users, whose rights might be further threatened by the push for ever-greater control by states and corporations. The Internet has, in a relatively short amount time, become an essential instrument for today’s citizens. Take China for example, the population of Internet users has reached five million and the number of applications users has also dramatically increased since 2010. The relationship between access to media and other information sources and citizen empowerment is a critical issue to consider when discussing internet regulation. It is obvious that the increasing convergence of information, multimedia, and transmission technologies is having a rapid fundamental social, economic and political impact on both the developing and developed worlds. Over the last few years, the deployment and exploitation of technology in support of socio-economic development has been a high priority on the development agenda, especially in the Global South. ICT4D programs have been implemented in places like Asia and Africa out of the belief that
creativity and innovation can flourish when citizens have access to computers, servers, routers and mobile devices, and services such as cloud computing.

As underlined in the remarks made by seminar participants, in the past decade, the world has already witnessed historic internet policy debates over various issues like online intellectual property, privacy, cyber attacks, and so on. These issues have divided many organizations, academics, companies, and policymakers in the United States and Europe. However, how can the debates concentrated in the West really become a “global” debate? How should this debate lead people to a more thorough understanding of the powers that controls the global informational space? And how and when will people realize the power that they already have or should have? Inspired by the seminar discussions, I was very glad to be able to think about these questions; and I believe more studies on the Internet's current and potential roles around the globe are sorely needed to reach a common ground.

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THE MEDIA AND ITS ROLE TODAY

By Shalini Iyengar

“Journalism can never be silent: that is its greatest virtue and its greatest fault. It must speak, and speak immediately, while the echoes of wonder, the claims of triumph and the signs of horror are still in the air.” – Henry Anatole Grunwald

“So have I heard, and do in part believe it” - Hamlet

The 2012 Milton Wolf Seminar raised several important issues concerning media law and policy. These issues ranged from the limits of internet freedom, to soft power and information sovereignty, to media and its contested influence on the democratization process, to the changing relationship between the state and the media. Taken together, these issues underscore that the media, broadly defined, can serve as both a meeting ground and a mouthpiece and function both as a tool and an actor. Against this backdrop, it would seem to me that, as Niklas Luhmann argued, “whatever we know about our society, or indeed about the world in which we live, we know through the mass media.”

Media theorist Neil Postman, in his book Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business, argued that Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World was a more accurate summation of our times than George Orwell’s 1984. Orwell feared that those in power would streamline and control thought by restricting information. Huxley, on the other hand, depicted mind control occurring through a mechanism vastly more difficult to oppose—by conditioning people to want only certain types of information—creating a world where we wouldn’t know or care to seek the truth because we were too busy focusing elsewhere.

The Arab Spring and other recent upheavals illustrate the truth of Huxley’s argument. In Egypt, state-controlled media traditionally experienced privileged positions. Unsurprisingly, protestors targeted the state media offices during the early days of the revolution and have continued to organize sit-ins and other actions objecting to the lack of state media reform. On the other hand, American and Indian media, for example, usually play the instant gratification card, focusing on sensationalist news stories and advocacy journalism characterized by sound bites aimed at increasing ratings. These trends are particularly true for television, and increasingly so for print media. Frequently, the emphasis is on entertainment and sports sections with the actual news buried somewhere beneath. Given that the Egyptian protests sought the overthrow of the system at large and the Indian and the US governments still tout their democratic legitimacy, res ipsa loquitur. It is, of course, important to emphasize that the above observation does not necessarily speak of the legitimacy of the media itself; India and the United States demonstrate sharply

different public approval ratings about the media.\textsuperscript{10} What it does mean, however, is that looking at the way the world works today, Huxley's vision seems to have won out, which is significant. In a world where we simply have access to too much information, one looks at the supposedly legitimate media sources as being the best harbingers and guardians of the truth. But who is it that watches the watchers?

Although advocacy journalism has become the order of the day, the conflation of factual reporting and opinion remains controversial. With mushrooming internet access fueling the decentralization of media, anyone can become a “journalist.” The term “media” increasingly represents a gamut of possible actors. These range from massive media conglomerates to citizen journalists with a camera phone. Indubitably, the marketplace of ideas can become a bewildering cacophony if everyone seeks to put in their two cents simultaneously. This is especially relevant since the media is as influential in shaping the news as it is in relaying it, a trend amplified by modern forms of communication. Organizational websites, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube are among the many interfaces that allow media actors to bypass traditional delivery platforms and bring their analyses and reports directly to consumers. The internet's ability to foster direct and instantaneous communication without governmental filters and editorial pressures is undoubtedly an important factor in increasing the media’s influence in our daily lives.

However, while media actors can offer valuable insights through investigative reporting and in-depth analysis directed at discerning audiences, the issue of accountability remains. Vested power interests finance most media actors, whether it be through direct financial and regulatory support or through corporate advertising. Moreover, opacity surrounding funding sources and a lack of regulatory oversight render them open to accusations of lobbying and conflicts of interest. Questions about different media actor’s willingness and ability to criticize their donors—including governments and special interest groups—are inevitable. As more and more media actors expand their global operations, questions arise about media accountability and the formal jurisdiction of legal and regulatory mechanisms. For example, the Milton Wolf Seminar dedicated a whole morning to discussing the legality of the 2010 Hungarian Press Freedom Act (which gave the Hungarian regulator the ability to control print and internet media) in the context of European Union legislation. Another case that has generated considerable coverage is the 2011 South African Protection of State Information Bill, which made it a crime punishable by up to twenty-five years in jail to publish information deemed as classified by the government.

As globalization scholar Manfred Steger argues, discussions about media today are inextricably linked with discourses about globalization.\textsuperscript{11} One essential element of globalization discourse is that it is instrumental in encouraging democracy. The strength of this claim about the link between globalization and democracy is rooted in the manner in


which certain “facts” have been hardwired into the fundamentals of our understanding of the issue. These facts ensure that arguments about globalization and democracy only take place within certain limits and do not reach towards an a priori attack on the notion itself since we frequently debate the issue without challenging underlying assumptions. Steger’s demarcation of globalization as a “narrative, discourse and ideology” is certainly not far off the mark. Globalization rhetoric tends to persist even when its fundamental assumptions (the myth of efficient free markets being one) have been disproved, as the ongoing financial crisis would testify to. Arguably, in more than one instance, globalization has been the legitimating patina placed on inequity and power symmetries.

The role that the mass media plays in this process of globalization is multi-faceted. It creates new scales by which power is measured, impacts the relationship between these scales, reconfigures entities and builds, as the linguist Norman Fairclough argues, sustains “a new ‘fix’ between a regime of accumulation and a mode of social regulation.” The media is able to play these multiple roles because they are the primary vehicles for contemporary information dissemination. It is both interesting and apt that the etymology of the word media comes from the Latin word medium. Until the seventeenth century, medium meant “a middle ground, quality, or degree” when it became understood as an “intermediate agency, channel of communication.” This points to the inherent tensions within the media today since competing impulses jostle for supremacy; the holy grail of journalistic objectivity often runs aground when reporting is clearly predicated on beliefs that are far from neutral. The media, as primary information providers, help to formulate culture by affecting belief and praxis, which supports certain economic and political regimes.

According to German Sociologist, Niklas Luhmann the crucial aspect of contemporary mass media is that “no interaction among those co-present can take place between senders and receivers.” However, the proliferation of social media and mobile and internet technologies increasingly allows for a two-way exchange of ideas and culture. If there is one lesson that the many millennia of human civilization has taught us, it is that cultural boundaries are highly porous and permeable. For example, beginning from pre-historic times, art and culture have flowed between peoples, along trade routes and across borders. As mentioned at the Milton Wolf Seminar, the influence of popular culture on perceptions and ideas should never be underemphasized. However, when one views the facts of globalization and exchange, it is clear that the flows are more from the Global North to the Global South than vice versa. In my mind, one of the main reasons for this imbalance is simply that one of the two sides involved has made a better use of the medium. However,

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13 The word scale is defined as: “the arena and moment, both discursively and materially, where socio-spatial power relations are contested and compromises are negotiated and regulated. Scale, therefore, is both the result and the outcome of social struggle for power and control […] theoretical and political priority never resides in a particular geographical scale but rather in the process through which particular scales become re(constituted).” Eric Swyngedouw. (1997) “Neither Global nor Local: Globalization and the Politics of Scale,” in Kevin R.Cox (Ed) Spaces of Globalization. New York: Longman: 137-66. In essence, a scale is “a space where diverse economic, political, social and cultural relations are articulated together as ‘some kind of structured coherence.” (Fairclough 2006: 65)
14 Fairclough (2006: 97)
15 Luhmann (2007: 2)
when “media savvy” coincides with the possession of more financial wherewithal, questions about the more insidious aspects of domination *via* the media arise. Media actors are the most responsive to those who have the power to lobby and engage.

It is perhaps ironic that social media now outmatch mass media in the very characteristics that made mass media such an effective tool for the power elite—its breadth, its responsiveness, and its ability to disseminate ideas. Unlike mass media, social media is more *communicative* in nature because it is generated by user engagement and multidirectional conversation. These characteristics of social media challenge Luhmann’s critique that most of media platforms are unidirectional. As discussed during the Milton Wolf Seminar, social media played a variety of roles in the Arab Spring and its aftermath—as organizing and fundraising tools, as mass communication devices, and as mechanisms for freedom of expression—touching lives in disparate parts of the globe. Social media provides citizens around the world with spaces to make common cause with likeminded people and make their voices heard. As discussed during the Seminar, states like China and Iran have tried to control these spaces for discourse and debate. Indeed, if there is one defining hallmark of totalitarianism, it is that it does not allow for doubt or discussion. As optimistic as this might sound, the same media technologies that may render Huxley and Orwell’s fictitious visions of mind control a reality, can also facilitate the emergence of alternative points of view. Which is not to say that it always will; this is certainly not an assertion that the alternate point of view will always win. I am simply saying that alternate points of view will continue to exist and, occasionally create common ground for people to rally around. What follows thus, is that few things are, in and of themselves, inherently good or evil. What gives them that character is the ways and means of their use. The media possesses the potential to be many things at many points in time and indeed, if there is a conclusion possible to an issue which is still very much an open debate, it is simply that the media remains as much an instrument as ever—it depends on the wielders.

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Shalini Iyengar was selected as an Emerging Scholar Delegate to the 2012 Milton Wolf Seminar. She is an LL.M. student studying Comparative Law, Law, Economics and Finance at the International University College, Turin after having completed her degree in arts and law at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore. She’s a keen observer of the transformative role that media can play in a democracy and the power it wields in both developed and developing countries. In her free time Shalini likes to travel, talk, read and amuse her friends by pursuing increasingly arcane hobbies like visiting old bookstores and collecting stamps.
SOFT POWER AND THE SUBALTERN: WHO WINS?
By Marissa Moran

During lunch on the first day of the Milton Wolf Seminar, a group of us, students, started discussing soft power and its place in international relations theory. One of the other scholars was trying to clarify whether soft power, defined as the ability to wield influence through attraction and co-option rather than coercion, requires a source of hard power (i.e. military and economic strength that can be used with force) behind it in order to have weight and thus to be considered power at all. We concluded that yes, it seems safe to say that Joseph Nye’s theory of soft power assumes that any state or actor wielding soft power most likely also has the ability to use hard power. I suppose one could argue that soft power varies depending on whether the source of hard power behind it is military or monetary strength.

Facebook, for example, while it originated in the United States, serves a global audience and has widespread cultural influence. Facebook doesn’t arm itself with tanks and bombs, but it does have lots of money that allow it to extend its network and brand globally. As Facebook gains more users and makes itself attractive to people around the world, one could argue that Facebook—and other transnational corporations for that matter—use soft power for its own economic benefit. Facebook also potentially represents U.S. interests abroad through this networked version of soft power. An interesting 2009 CFR interview with Elliot Schrage, VP of Global Communications, Marketing, and Public Policy, Facebook, discusses the strengths and weaknesses of governmental use of social media, though he claims there is not yet an online equivalent to international broadcasting efforts such as Voice of America.

In the first panel, entitled “From Soft Power to Soft War: Information Rights and National Sovereignty,” the panelists discussed information flows and the boundaries and norms of freedom of expression. They looked at Iran as a case study for soft war, and explained the difference between soft war and soft power; soft war is psychological warfare that may result in regime change without the use of military force (think the 2011 Arab spring) while soft power leads to political change but not regime change.

So have Facebook and other social media assisted this shift from soft power to soft war? In the end, who benefits from such a shift? Is it the people in the countries where the change takes place, or is it the international actors—often originating in the West—that are credited for much of the change? At the top of the hype cycle about Facebook and Twitter’s role in the Arab Spring, pundits across the political spectrum—even academic scholars—went so far as to say the revolutions happened because of these tools. I couldn’t help but wonder if Mark Zuckerberg felt like a god, simply because everyone was acting like his invention changed the world. Don’t forget the viral “Thank You Facebook,” photo. However, with Internet penetration only...
15% in Libya, how democratic were these “revolutions”?

In Nye’s theory, soft power has perpetuated the power balance of the West over the rest, with information flows traditionally flowing to rather than from the Global South. Seminar discussions, which covered a range of examples including the Western promotion of internet circumvention tools in Iran to defy government censorship of the online public sphere and encourage—suggest a shift from soft power to soft war. But does this also change the global flow of power? One of my favorite quotes from the seminar came in a later panel: After extensive media coverage of the 2011 uprisings and western consumption of such coverage, is “orientalism changing in Ohio?” (No offense, Ohio, but it makes for great alliteration).

One participant suggested comparing Iranian notions of soft war versus Western notions of the term. This tied into another comment made about understanding information flows from the perspective of the receiver. My current research will seek to do just that as I attempt to identify how narratives among the Somali diaspora in the UK respond to the strategic narratives coming from the transitional federal government in Somalia. Ultimately, it’s a question about power and whether information flows maintain current power structures or allow room for the subaltern to challenge the status quo.16

Another theme that arose during the seminar surrounded the responsibility of private businesses (i.e. Google and Facebook) to respect freedom of expression. With algorithms and filters that automatically omit certain information from your Facebook newsfeed depending on your pattern of “likes” and click-throughs, there is a new type of censorship in town. I myself add to the definitional confusion by calling online networks like Facebook and Twitter “social media.” It’s dubious whether these sites perform the same functions as traditional media platforms like The New York Times and the BBC. Social media allow users to share news and spread messages to massive quantities of people, but they are not creating the news—or are they? If their algorithms determine what news and messages users see or don’t then they are indeed playing gatekeeper, a role traditionally reserved for broadcasters and newspaper editors. If social networks and traditional media organizations both demand the ability to exercise freedom of expression, as the former did during the SOPA and PIPA17 debates and the latter do every day, then they must also respect the responsibilities that come with such freedom.

Terms like mediation and social media are elusive and difficult to define; this brings us to the question: what are the international norms regarding information flows? As many people asked throughout the seminar in Vienna, who has the right to set those standards? I’m personally interested in the question of who sets standards for information flows, because of the people these standards commonly exclude, often called the subaltern. Can we assume that if people are not connected—if they don’t have internet or news access—

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16 The subaltern refers to “people without access to the lines of social mobility,” or in another sense, “a position without an identity,” according to Gayatri Spivak. See the link to hear her explain the subaltern in her own words (begin at minute 09:00).

17 Two bills debated in the US Congress and Senate that proposed expanding the government’s ability to enforce copyright violations on the internet
then they don’t have a say? Will they always be receivers and never senders? How would the subalterns themselves respond to this question?

Wait... I thought we were supposed to emerge from two days at the Diplomatic Academy with the answers, not more questions! Simply put, the answers probably don’t exist yet. As mentioned at the Seminar, these changes – and their effects – are more likely generational than immediate. Also, let’s hope we are open enough to allow ourselves to accept changing narratives, even the ones we construct as scholars. How can we expect governments and political systems to change if we ourselves are not willing to when necessary? (Last question, I promise!)

It was an honor to sit at the table with such notable scholars and professionals who are contributing to positive change every day. Thank you to everyone who participated and made the 2012 Milton Wolf Seminar a special occasion for deliberation, discovery, and some healthy debate.

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Marissa Moran is currently in the MSc Media, Communications, and Development program at The London School of Economics. She completed her Bachelor’s in Political Communication and International Affairs, Peace and Conflict Studies at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. in 2010.

She entered the field of international media assistance through her undergraduate honors thesis, which compared media development projects in post-conflict Rwanda and Bosnia and emphasized the need for media regulation and policy approaches in future post-conflict interventions. Her current Masters dissertation will analyze the reception of and response to strategic narratives about Somalia among the Somali diaspora community in the UK.

From 2010-2011 Marissa served in the U.S. community service network AmeriCorps, coordinating secondary and post-secondary educational opportunities for low-income and immigrant youth. Originally from Norwalk, Connecticut, she currently works for Albany Associates, a media development and strategic communications firm that works in post-conflict and transitional states.
THE TANGLED WEB OF "INTERNET FREEDOM"

By Roy Revie

Recognition of the powerful and disruptive roles which Internet-based communication (particularly social and new media) play in the contemporary social and political environment underlay the 2012 Milton Wolf Seminar discussions. New information flows and ways of communicating and organizing challenge accepted political practices, the tenability of old norms, and the power of state actors who rely on a privileged role in the information-space. Yet there is a concern that the novelty of changing information flows eclipses traditional realpolitik issues of power and sovereignty. Discourse risks being swept up in a whirlwind of the “New.” Policy is driven by hype; and analysis, by going along for the ride, is impoverished.

This risk is especially strong in the area of foreign policy. The focus of the seminar on political change and the new media environment can be seen as an attempt to find some analytical solid ground on which to build new understandings of the dynamics of political change in the Internet Age. In this respect, it was discussions on the role of Internet in international relations that I found most intriguing, particularly the Web’s role in contemporary US foreign policy towards authoritarian states. In this essay, I would like to tackle some issues raised in discussion on the State Department’s “Internet Freedom” program, as outlined at the Seminar led by Sarah Labowitz, policy advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Specifically, I would like to problematize some of the assertions made from the US-perspective during the seminar and elsewhere, argue that they inhibit satisfactory international debate on the issues, and discuss how they relate to the fear of a “soft war” being waged via the Internet. I maintain that a more nuanced and honest understanding of the challenges posed by the Internet to international relations is required, and that this understanding must be based on a more robust analysis of state power online.

Under Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s leadership, the US State Department’s "Internet Freedom" agenda has taken center stage in US foreign policy. While the US uses the Internet as a tool to pursue many different foreign policy goals, Labowitz explained that Internet Freedom should be seen as a distinct policy priority. Internet Freedom, as distinct from the use of the Web for public diplomacy or public affairs, refers to a "principled defense of the Internet as an open public space" and the support of the idea of "a single Internet." The policy asserts the "freedom to connect," defined as "the freedom of expression, association, and assembly online, rooted in existing human rights norms." The Internet Freedom strand of State Department policy sees the Internet as a space, not as a tool, and argues that this space must be protected and promoted. Unfortunately, this conception of the Internet as a space is highly problematic. It systematically ignores the contradictions and challenges of new online communication and presents a simplistic conception of the debate. This precludes serious engagement and international debate on a number of important issues. The problematic assertion of a distinct Internet Freedom policy, the notion of "a single Internet," and the application of existing norms to new situations impoverish debate about the politics of the Internet at the international level.
Most immediate is the problem of attempting to section off the Internet Freedom Program from other elements of State Department activity. An understanding of Internet Freedom as a policy of space preservation distinct from the use of the Internet as a tool for foreign policy is simply not tenable. In her speeches on the subject, Secretary Clinton mentions a number of “hard” foreign policy priorities. For example, her 2010 speech was prefaced with a mention of the "Voice Act" which authorized funding of Farsi language propaganda channels and granted $20 million for the development and distribution of anti-censorship tools for Iranians and "internet-based education programs and other exchanges with Americans online." Under these circumstances, it is simply not realistic to expect analysts (let alone foreign states!) to accept this distinction. As a policy priority, internet freedom may represent a dispassionate concern with the space alone, but, as an institution, the US State Department routinely uses the Internet as a tool to achieve foreign policy priorities. This point should hardly need to be argued; the purpose of the State Department is to spend American money to achieve foreign policy goals. We should not expect it to do otherwise.

In order to talk properly about the Internet and foreign policy we must understand how it is currently used, to base debate in fact rather than in rhetoric. Internet Freedom is not simply a debating position for the State Department. It is something State attempts to facilitate through the provision of circumvention and other anti-censorship and digital security tools. They also provide training to foreign citizens in more-repressive Internet environments, particularly to activists (over 7,500 undefined ‘activists’ had received such training as of March 2012). State also works with American tech companies to leverage Internet tools for foreign policy goals. We can see this alliance developing through in the increasingly revolving door between Foggy Bottom and Silicon Valley and through the partnership with Google, YouTube, Facebook, and others in the Alliance for Youth Movements. AYM (now rebranded as Movements.org) is a networking group for global youth activist groups that has received State Department funding. It is complemented by events like "Tech Camp," which trains activists and civil society groups in the use of online tools for organizing and protest. Given this multiplicity of ways in which the State Department is using the Internet for foreign policy goals, the notion of a separate Internet Freedom policy is a deceit that renders the debate about the role of the Internet in international relations impossible.

The second problematic issue is the concept of the "single internet." The Internet is notionally an open, free, and equal space. Yet, an analysis of traffic, content, and ownership suggests that hierarchies of power and influence have developed on top of this framework, such that it has been said that the Internet forms part of the American political space. This is underlined by the British academic Daniel McCarthy, who illustrates how US discourse

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on the development of the Internet has consistently used the naturalized idea of the “single Internet” and human rights rhetoric to subjugate concerns about national sovereignty or cultural sensitivity. In this light, ideas of the Internet as “the public space of the 21 Century – the world’s town square, classroom, marketplace” (Clinton’s 2011 speech) must be critically challenged: the world may come to congregate, learn, and trade but it is within a system where the US exerts disproportionate power. From the pressure placed on WikiLeaks through US-based internet giants like PayPal, to the potential extradition to the US for copyright offenses of UK citizen Richard Dwyer, who has never been to the US or even used a server based there, a political-economy of the Internet demonstrates that the US maintains a powerful grip on the Web’s future role in international relations. The call for a “single Internet” on these terms, again, masks a refusal to recognize serious issues of power and sovereignty, and conduct the debate about the future of the Internet in a productive and open manner.

The third way in which the Internet Freedom agenda masks live political issues can be seen in the assertion that we do not need new norms to govern online communication, that the "existing ones apply equally online as they do offline,” and that we should not allow authoritarian governments the "opportunity to re-litigate these norms.“20 I wholeheartedly agree with the later point; yet we cannot simply transpose old norms to, in a sense, pre-litigate communication online. Norms are a function of the architecture of the system in which they are practiced and are firmly rooted in the political, moral, and structural contingencies of their conception. To simply posit the applicability of existing norms to a new situation is insufficient. It seems uncontroversial to say that the existing freedoms of expression, of assembly, and association apply to the Internet. From a purely ethical standpoint, I would agree; but the American state does not operate in the domain of ethics. To assert the applicability of old norms in new situations is problematic both practically and politically. How, for example, do we reconcile freedom of expression with other norms such as the right to a fair trial when the free flow of vast quantities of information can quickly prejudice potential jurors? New situations and new capabilities demand a re-evaluation of norms as they produce new situations and new dilemmas. To treat the debate as settled is analytically sloppy; and to expect rival nations to do so is fantasy.

This look at State Department policy (and we haven’t even touched upon US Military policy or the role of US-based companies in mediating Web experiences) places in its proper context Professor Monroe Price’s account of the Iranian regime’s claim that it is a victim of a "soft war" waged through the Internet. It is easy to shrug off these accusations as paranoia on the part of the Islamic Republic; but when looked at holistically, the US Government’s leveraging of internet technology for foreign policy goals is understandably threatening to foreign governments. During the Seminar, Price described the Iranian view of “soft war” as a fear of "psychological warfare...regime change without military force," the main aim being to "force the system to disintegrate from within" through challenging the ideas, identity, and culture of a foreign country.

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20 This quote is an excerpt from a presentation made during the 2012 Milton Wolf Seminar by Sarah Labowitz, policy advisor to Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. March 26, 2012.
There are two levels on which the Iranian regime can hold a "cultural NATO" responsible for undermining Iranian sovereignty and promoting destabilization, and thus justify crackdowns and limitations on internet freedom. At the most obvious level, they can point to direct attempts by the US to interfere in the political situation in Iran via the Internet. These attempts range from engagement with youth activists to direct intervention by the State Department in keeping Twitter online during the 2009 post-election protests. An act that, as an Iranian activist told me, "killed social media in Iran." The immediate response to such an accusation seems to be "stop interfering." Interference undermines internet users in repressive countries; activists do not want it; and it creates an Internet arms spending-race on repressive (and frequently Western-made) technology. Furthermore, as I have argued throughout, recognition is needed that these activities are—correctly, I might add—perceived as a part of the way the Internet is used for foreign policy purposes.

The second level on which repressive regimes can justify a backlash against the Internet is by arguing that the Internet, through its very essence, undermines cultural, social, and political sovereignty and order. Notably, this concern is not exclusive to repressive regimes. In Western liberal democracies the Internet has had such effects; and the ways that these governments have dealt with it also remains a matter of concern. The Internet's ability to bring people together, to let them share information and ideas is its greatest power, where it is had the most impact. This is exactly how Sarah Labowitz defined the power of the distinct "Internet Freedom" program. The problems come when states attempts to wield this power—when the Internet is used as a tool, no matter what the accompanying rhetoric says. During the opening session of the Seminar, Iranian academic, Babak Rahimi argued that the Internet’s greatest influence takes place through its role as a “social space.” In Iran, it has already created new tastes, new ways of acting. He underlined the need to "enable social spaces to grow and perhaps lead to political participation and new ways of looking at politics in authoritarian contexts." Rahimi’s statement emphasizes that the Internet’s greatest ability to enact change rests upon its organic nature.

The Internet creates opportunities for new communicative forms, new ways of doing politics that lie outside of politico-economic determinism. In order to temper the ad hoc claiming of regulatory space by governments, the assertion of power on the fly, and the fear of the Internet being used as a tool of foreign intervention (which is perhaps one of the biggest threats to its use for domestic change), what is needed is an honest assessment of where power lies on the Web. In short, we need to recognize that the Internet throws up many problems for notions of freedom, rights, and sovereignty. This year’s Seminar provided a great place from which to get started on producing a discourse aimed at working through these issues rather than foreclosing debate.
About the Author

Revie, Roy
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Roy Revie was selected as an Emerging Scholar Delegate to the 2012 Milton Wolf Seminar. He is a doctoral researcher at the University of Bath (UK) examining the mediation of power in the digital age. His research explores the communication and information aspects of contemporary conflict - particularly the impact of social and new media on diplomatic and military communication. He is from Scotland.
COMPETING NARRATIVES OVER INTERNET FREEDOM

By Sandra Ristovska

An underlying theme of the two days of discussion at this year’s Milton Wolf Seminar was whether and how political systems influence and/or interfere with media systems. This theme was particularly apparent in the conversations about the global struggle for internet freedom. Questions that emerged included: How do competing narratives over the definition of internet freedom play out in policy and advocacy efforts? What are the new realities of power, freedom and control in the internet age? Is there a normative framework for internet governance? Who gets to decide the norms and regulations?

Over the past few years, concern over preserving the internet’s essential attributes as a free and open means of communication has grown exponentially, fueled in part by the belief that it is and can continue to be a platform for social, political, and economic change. Government, civil society, and IT industry actors around the world grapple with issues over internet freedom. Although various actors have outlined components of internet freedom—open and decentralized, neutral and non-discriminatory, user-centric and user-controlled, abundant, global and borderless—the aspirational terms used to define internet freedom conflict with digital realities. As states like China and Iran seek to extend their regulatory authority over the internet, there is a rising anxiety among internet freedom advocates about the ramifications of a territorialized digital environment. Yet, we should remember that although free access to information enables communication and exchange of ideas, it does not automatically lead to democratization.

With internet penetration hovering around 50% in Iran, the Iranian government, for example, relies on internet and technology to spread its ideas and to promote a national narrative of regime legitimacy.21 Chinese internet censorship is old news for most people. As Rebecca MacKinnon—whose work was referenced by Seminar participants—argues in her book Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom, the Chinese government promotes “authoritarian deliberation.” China’s parliament has an “e-parliament,” a website that encourages open dialogue on a wide spectrum of topics including local corruption, financial reforms, and the controversial one-child policy. The difference between democratic and authoritarian deliberation is that in the authoritarian regime setting, the state establishes the parameters of political speech. In this sense, the authoritarian regimes—such as China and Iran to an extent—indeed have created a digital environment in which they can benefit from lively online discussions on numerous issues that are in line with the national narratives. MacKinnon, for example, explains that, while China would immediately censor an online discussion about multiparty electoral reform, it would support postings about the one-child policy since in the last couple of years the government has been modifying this policy. Hence, the central Chinese government sees the online discussions helpful in measuring potential public reaction to upcoming policy changes. The China case highlights the existence of various definitions and policy

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implementations of internet freedom. Indeed, China argues that it supports its own internet democracy.

Various government, corporate, and civil society actors use both aspirational and factual terms to construct narratives that influence internet governance. These narratives make distinguishing between freedom of, via, and with the internet not only a rhetorical activity but also, perhaps, a methodological one. As academics, it is our responsibility to explore the ways in which these internet freedoms are constructed because they have important implications for media law and policy. How do we frame internet freedom on a global scale? What happens to countries where governments have figured out ways to use the Internet as a space that spreads populist discourse and supports the status quo? These are ongoing concerns for promoters of internet freedom.

The IT industry corporations that produce the technologies necessary for Internet connectivity also play a complicated role in the debate. While simultaneously opening up new communicative spaces through providing advanced networking technologies, corporations like Cisco and Nokia Siemens have been also involved in furthering governmental control of information, which in some cases has resulted in human rights abuses. For example, Nokia Siemens was accused of facilitating torture in Bahrain. Privacy International has been vocal about the danger of surveillance technologies, and Former White House Official Andrew McLaughlin calls surveillance a free expression issue.

The inconsistent narratives over internet freedom are not exclusive to the non-Western world. The principle of intermediary liability—which holds the content creator not the ISP or website host responsible—has been a source of controversy in both the United States and the European Union. Very recently, we witnessed protracted debates about three pieces of legislation: Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), Senate counterpart Protect IP Act (PIPA) and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). SOPA and PIPA proponents argued that the bills would inhibit online copyright infringement. Opponents of the bills were vocal and organized in their assertions that minimized intermediary “gatekeeping” assists freedom of expression online and that the legislation would move the Internet towards rigorous censorship and control. They also argued that important online platforms would cease to exist if they were faced with the burden of reviewing enormous amounts of content for copyright violation. Moreover, SOPA and PIPA could become powerful and often non-transparent tools for corporate and state censorship. As described in an Electronic Frontier Foundation summary, ACTA opponents raised “concerns for consumers’ privacy and civil liberties for innovation and the free flow of information on the Internet legitimate commerce.” Legal rulings around the world have also challenged the principle of intermediary liability. In 2010, an Italian court found Google executives guilty of privacy violations after a student posted a video of the bullying of an autistic boy online. At the very least, the examples suggest that we—civil society, governments, and citizens—have yet to negotiate how best to address the issue of intermediary liability, how best to formulate regulatory responses about internet freedom, and how best to regulate technology companies in order to ensure they are not assisting foreign governments in human rights abuses.
Many Seminar participants stressed the problems surrounding the normative framing of internet freedom, which has typically focused on freedom of expression and international human rights. Freedom of expression, as articulated by Article 19 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), includes the “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” Numerous civil society groups who advocate for free and open internet around the world, such as the Center for Democracy and Technology, have adopted it as a guiding principle. This perspective is partial because it limits the definition of the internet as a means of communication while potentially ignoring its function as a social space.

Equating offline and online human rights and freedom, therefore, is a way of broadening public understanding about internet freedom. In her well known January 2010 “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asserted the United States' perspective, “the Internet is a network that magnifies the power and potential of all others. And that's why we believe it's crucial that its users are assured certain basic freedoms. Freedom of expression is first among them.” She later describes the “freedom to connect ... to the Internet, to websites, or to each other” as the final freedom, which recognizes the function of the Internet as a social space. Some Milton Wolf Seminar participants questioned whether the universal human rights framework could work better especially since there are inconsistencies between how Western democracies articulate online freedom of expression norms and how they implement them at home, which authoritarian governments can easily point out. Moreover, the focus on freedom of expression often overlooks the importance of freedom to connect. Regardless of whether we situate conversations about internet freedom within the international freedom of expression norms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the right to connect discourse, we confine the discussion to political contexts. Yet, Shanthi Kalathil in her background paper on internet freedom prepared for the Aspen Institute International Digital Economic Accords (IDEA) Project points to another critical aspect of internet freedom—which has grown in relevance but still is not widely discussed—that of economics and trade. Given the commercial implications, can and should internet censorship be treated as a trade issue?

Various concluding remarks at the Seminar stressed the critical nature of information rights. Normative regulatory responses to the protection of information rights however, are often at the heart of the tension between containment and interaction. On one hand, countries like Iran and China attempt to contain information rights within geographic nation-state boundaries. On the other hand, even vocal objections to norms such as “the right to connect” are best characterized as dialogic, an entry into a conversations. Norms can be created, modified, and changed. Therefore, governments, civil society and private sector need to keep the conversation alive.
About the Author

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Sandra Ristovska is a rising third year doctoral student at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania. As a documentary filmmaker, a former radio journalist, and an aspiring communication scholar, she thinks broadly about media narratives and their resonance locally and internationally. Specifically, her dissertation examines the historical resonance and situated nature of Romani cultural and media narratives within three different contexts—the Balkans, the European Union, and the United States. Her scholarly work has been presented at numerous conferences including the International Association for Media and Communication Research, International Communication Association, and the Society for Cinema and Media Studies. Her documentary film Kaleidoscope was a Region II finalist for Student Academy Awards. Ristovska is a recipient of 13 November - the City of Skopje Award, a prestigious award that the National Committee of the City of Skopje, Macedonia, gives to selected citizens in recognition of high achievements.
ABOUT THE MILTON WOLF EMERGING SCHOLARS PROGRAM

The Milton Wolf Seminar represents a unique opportunity for distinguished diplomats, academics, and media practitioners to interact with graduate students and other emerging scholars in an intimate and intellectually engaging setting. In order to maximize opportunities for students and emerging scholars and to enrich the discussions, this year, the seminar organizers selected eight outstanding PhD students, advanced MA Candidates, emerging scholars or equivalents that are working in areas related to the seminar themes. These delegates were chosen from an elite pool of applicants nominated by their home institutions. Selected student and emerging scholar delegates received full funding to attend the Seminar.

The Emerging Scholars Programme was made possible by the support of the UK Embassy in Vienna and The American Austrian Foundation.

The eight distinguished 2012 delegates include:

1. **Rogier Creemers**, KU Leuven, Candidate at Maastricht, Visiting Researcher Programme for Comparative Media Law and Policy, University of Oxford
2. **Endre Dányi**, PhD Candidate in Sociology, Lancaster University; Visiting Research Fellow at the Innovation in Governance research group, Center for Technology and Society at the Technical University in Berlin
4. **Leshuo Dong**, PhD Candidate Tinghua University, Visiting Scholar, Center for Global Communication Studies at the University of Pennsylvania Annenberg School for Communication
5. **Shalini Iyengar**, LLM Candidate, Comparative Law, Economics and Finance at the International University College, Torino
6. **Marissa Moran**, MSc Candidate, London School of Economics; Research Associate, Albany Associates UK.
7. **Roy Revie**, PhD Candidate, University of Strathclyde
8. **Sandra Ristovska**, PhD Candidate, Annenberg School for Communication
ABOUT THE MILTON WOLF SEMINAR SERIES

Initiated in 2001 and held each March, the Milton Wolf Seminar represents an effort to explore cutting edge issues facing diplomacy and international relations. The organizers envision the Milton Wolf Seminar as a meeting place for media practitioners, diplomats, academics, and students to share their perspectives, formulate new ideas, and identify areas where further research is needed. While the seminar incorporates various speakers and panels, it is designed as a two-day continuing conversation in which all participants are encouraged to openly engage in dialogue and explore potential synergies and future collaborations. In order to encourage an open exchange of ideas, seminar attendance is limited only to invited participants and students.

The 2012 seminar was jointly organized by the Center for Global Communication Studies (CGCS) at the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication, The American Austrian Foundation (AAF), and the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna (DA). Guests included employees of state and multi-lateral organizations, journalists, media development practitioners, academics, and a select group of eminent graduate students interested in the seminar themes. Between 2001 and 2012, over 310 students have participated in the Milton Wolf Seminar.

About Milton A. Wolf

Milton A. Wolf was an economist, investor, and real estate developer who served as President Jimmy Carter’s ambassador to Austria in the late 1970s. In that function, Wolf played a key role in arranging details of the meeting between President Carter and Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev for the signing of the Salt II Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

Austria’s dedication to humanitarian efforts – taking in over 200,000 freedom fighters from the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, and Czech refugees from the Prague Spring in 1968 – convinced Ambassador Wolf that the Austrian people supported individuals of any race, religion, or culture. This understanding ignited Ambassador Wolf’s determination to reward Austria with his loyalty by strengthening Austro-American relations. In 1984, The American Austrian Foundation, Inc. (AAF) was founded, and Ambassador Wolf served as its Chairman from 1990 until his death in 2005.

He initiated and funded the Milton Wolf Fellowships for Young Journalists, (40 Austrian journalists were awarded fellowships to attend Duke University’s Visiting Media Fellowship Program) and the Milton Wolf Seminar for Journalists and Diplomats with the late Ambassador Ernst Sucharipa, then director of the Diplomatic Academy.

Ambassador Wolf received the Austrian Great Gold Medal of Honor with Sash (Austria’s highest decoration) and the Austrian Cross of Merit for Science/Arts First Class.
Previous Milton Wolf Seminar Topics

- **2011**: “Picking up the Pieces: Fragmented Sovereignties and Emerging Information Flows”
- **2010**: “New Media, New Newsmakers, New Public Diplomacy: The Changing Role of Journalists, NGOs, and Diplomats in a Multi-Modal Media World”
- **2004**: “Challenges for Journalists & Diplomats in the 21st Century”
- **2003**: “The Role of Media & Diplomacy in Ethnic Conflicts”
- **2002**: “Analyzing the Global Security Crisis: Challenges for Media & Diplomacy”
- **2001**: “Technology, Policy & Media”
ABOUT THE 2012 MILTON WOLF SEMINAR


Increasingly, governments and multilateral institutions around the world have articulated foreign policy doctrines about the role of the media and communications in society. Calls for “information rights” proliferate. Diplomats, journalists, academics, and pundits describe both old and new media as fundamental to contemporary international relations – as the primary transmission belts between governments and foreign publics and between foreign publics and domestic ones. Governments such as Iran, Libya, and Syria, who have attempted to restrict information rights, have been decried as pariahs. Journalism and press freedom organizations have been particularly pronounced in their condemnations of government attempts to restrict information rights and have made open calls for other international actors to intervene to protect those rights. For example, in a recent open letter to the fledgling Tunisian government, Reporters Without Borders cautioned, “...freedom of expression should be the subject of a consensus and should be protected by everyone as one of the revolution’s first gains. Everyone is concerned by it. It is the starting point for freedom. And it could be the point of return to dictatorship.”

Much attention has focused on the role of the internet and social networks. In a 2010 policy address, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a new pillar of American diplomacy: that the right of all global citizens “to connect” via internet and mobile networks is a human right on par with the freedom of assembly offline. Governments across the political spectrum have professed similar sentiments and committed millions of dollars to media and internet freedom campaigns and to the development of software designed to avoid internet filtering and censorship. Social media’s visible role in the Arab Spring only intensified discussions about the power of relationships formed via online networks to promote cross-cultural collaboration and dialogue and affect political and social change. Yet these discussions are not limited to internet and mobile technologies or to the global south. In October 2011, the European Union launched a Media Task Force to investigate increasing restrictions on the press in member states, particularly Italy and Hungary.

As countries such as Tunisia and Egypt move towards democratic transition and countries such as Hungary adopt new laws and policies that threaten to undermine democratic practices, considerable debate abounds about the future structure of democratic institutions and the role of the media in facilitating positive outcomes. Using case studies such as Hungary, Iran, Syria, Egypt, and Tunisia, the 2012 Milton Wolf Seminar investigated the evolving relationship between media and democratic transition in light of rapid technological change and the shifting structure and dynamics of the international communication system.
Suggested Further Reading

The following materials were suggested as further reading for 2012 Milton Wolf Seminar Participants.

Final Agenda

DAY ONE – MONDAY, MARCH 26, 2012

6:00 – 8:00 PM Welcome Reception and Registration at the Diplomatic Academy

DAY TWO: TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 2012

9:00 – 9:45 Introduction and Overview
- Katharine Eltz-Aulitzky, Executive Director, The American Austrian Foundation
- Monroe Price, Director, Center for Global Communications Studies, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania
- Ambassador Hans Winkler, Director, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

10:00 – 12:00 Session 1: From Soft Power to Soft War: Information Rights and National Sovereignty

This session examined competing ideologies of the internet as a communicative space for international relations. Some actors argue that the internet should and does represent a global public sphere open to all, equating the right to virtual assembly and the right to connect with human rights. Others argue that new internet filtering tools are allowing different states to reassert control. Panelists discussed the evolving roles of diplomats, media actors, citizen hacktivists, and others in dictating the present and future of the internet.

Moderator: Ambassador Hans Winkler, Diplomatic Academy
Panelists:
- Ženet Mujić, Senior Advisor, OSCE Freedom of the Media
- Monroe Price, Annenberg School for Communication
- Babak Rahimi, Assistant Professor of Iranian and Islamic Studies, UC San Diego
- Alexander Schallenberg, Spokesperson, Austrian Foreign Ministry (TBC)

12:00 – 1:30 Meet the Panelists Lunch

1:30 – 3:30 Session 2: The International Political Economy of the Internet: Technologies of Freedom and Technologies of Control

This panel explored the complex role of corporations such as Cisco, Yahoo, and Google in providing the technological infrastructure for furthering state control over the internet and for opening up new communicative spaces.

Moderator: Monroe Price, Annenberg School for Communication
Panelists:
- Rob Faris, Research Director of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society
- Sarah Labowitz, Policy Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. State Department
- Leshuo Dong, PhD Candidate, Tinghua University
3:30 – 5:30 Session 3: Acting from Knowledge: Polling, Evaluation and Evidence-based Action

Diplomats, pundits, and activists often treat the relationship between access to information and democratization as axiomatic: restrictive environments inhibit citizen voices, knowledge and engagement. In this panel, experts from leading polling and media development organizations involved in mapping media and information consumption patterns in closed and transitioning societies offered their insights into the contemporary relationship between access to media and other information sources and citizen empowerment and democratization.

**Moderator:** Amelia Arsenault, Center for Global Communications Studies, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania; Assistant Professor, Georgia State University

**Panelists:**
- Ali Karimzadeh Bangi, Researcher, Open Net Initiative, University of Toronto
- Eric Davin, Founding Partner, Altai Consulting
- George Weiss, Founder & CEO, Radio La Benevolencija
- Briar Smith, Project Manager, Iran Media Project

7:00 Walking Dinner – U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission, Christopher Hoh’s Residence

**DAY THREE: WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 2012**

9:00 – 12:15 Session 4: Slouching to and from Democracy: The Case of Hungary

Critics claim that a set of media laws implemented in Hungary in 2011 are inconsistent with democratic free-press principles and European practices and norms. Hungarian officials disagree, arguing that the legislation conforms to EU standards and actually draws from existing regulations in other European and EU member states. Hungary and its politically radical transformation are causing great strain within the European Union, instigating a re-examination of multilateral and national governance practices and the role of the media. This session, featuring panelists from both sides of the debate, sought to place transformations within the long debate over constitutionalism, representation and the role of media institutions.

**Moderator:** Ambassador Ferdinand Mayrhofer-Grünbühel, former Austrian Ambassador to Hungary

**Panelists:**
- Zoltán Kovács, Hungary’s State Secretary for Government Communications
- Attila Mesterhazy, Chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party
- Amy Brouillette, CMCS, Central European University
- Peter Bajomi-Lazar, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford
• Katharine Sarikakis, PhD, Professor of Media Governance, Department of Communication, University of Vienna

12:15 – 1:45 Lunch

2:00 – 3:45 Session 5: The Revolution was Televised: New Media and the Arab Spring One Year Later
As protestors across the Arab world took to the streets with their smartphones in hand, techno-optimists characterized the Arab Spring as the ultimate evidence of the democratizing influence of new communication technologies. Techno-pessimists remained uncertain, citing the critical role of Al Jazeera and of old fashioned person-to-person communication in facilitating protests. Drawing upon the events of the past year and a half, this panel discussed the role of new and old media in the Arab Spring and its aftermath.

Moderator & Panelist: Augusto Valeriani, Post Doctoral Researcher, University of Bologna
Panelists:
• Laurence Hargreaves, Social Researcher, Altai Consulting, Libya
• Nasir Yousafzai Khan, Al Jazeera English
• Kevin Anderson, Freelance Journalist and Digital Strategist

4:00 – 5:00 Session 6: New Issues, New Directions
During this closing session, panelists and participants participated in an open discussion about the major issues raised and conclusions formed out of the different sessions and case studies.

Moderators
• Monroe Price, Annenberg School for Communication
• Amelia Arsenault, Annenberg School for Communication and Georgia State University

7:30 Heurigen
About the Panelists

Arsenault, Amelia
Amelia Arsenault is an Assistant Professor of Communication at Georgia State University and serves as the Media and Democracy Research Fellow at the Center for Global Communication Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, Annenberg School. Her scholarly interests center on how different international and domestic actors have attempted to leverage the changing dynamics of communications systems, and the ramifications of those activities for international relations, political and social power relationships, and north/south inequality. In this capacity, she has conducted research on global media ownership, the impact of international donors in the southern African communications development, network theory, new media, and public diplomacy. Her current research projects include: a longitudinal investigation of the activities of international actors in the communications sector in southern Africa; and a co-edited book project (with Rhonda Zaharna and Ali Fischer) on the subject of collaborative and networked public diplomacy. Her scholarly work has appeared in the *International Journal of Communication, International Sociology, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, and Information, Communication, and Society*. She holds a B.A. in Film and History from Dartmouth College and an MSc in Global Media and Communication from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a PhD from the University of Southern California Annenberg School. Prior to her academic career, she spent several years as the film coordinator for the Zimbabwe International Film Festival Trust, a non-profit visual literacy organization in Harare, Zimbabwe.

Anderson, Kevin
Kevin Anderson is a freelance journalist and digital strategist working with news organizations and journalists around the world to help them develop strategies and skills to prepare them for digital, multi-platform journalism.

His work with news organizations included an effort at Al Jazeera that began before the events of the Arab Spring to train hundreds of their journalists, producers, editors and correspondents across Al Jazeera English, Arabic, Turk and Balkans in the use of mobile applications and in social media best practice. He also worked with the Al Jazeera online news teams to help them learn the latest digital journalism techniques.

In 2011, his consultancy also worked with Indian media giant Network18 to launch FirstPost, the company's first all-digital news service.

Kevin is a frequent speaker at conferences, including Digital Directions 11 in Sydney and the recent Lift conference in Geneva, discussing the business and practice of journalism.
From 2009 to 2010, he was the digital research editor at The Guardian, where he focused on evaluating and adapting digital innovations to support The Guardian’s journalism. He initially joined The Guardian in September 2006 as their first blogs editor after eight years with the BBC.

At the BBC, Kevin worked across the web, television and radio after joining the corporation in 1998 as their first online journalist outside of the UK, working as the Washington correspondent for BBCNews.com. In 2005, he came to the UK to write a blogging strategy for BBC News and was a member of the launch team for the interactive radio programme, World Have Your Say.

**Bajomi-Lazar, Peter**

Peter Bajomi-Lazar is a senior research fellow working on Media and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, a European Research Council project based at Oxford University’s Department of Politics and International Relations (2009–2013); and a professor of communication at the Budapest Business School. He earned a PhD in political science at the Central European University. His recent publications include “Audience Resistance: Reasons to Relax Content Regulation” in Media Freedom and Pluralism – Media Policy Challenges in the Enlarged Europe (Beata Klimkiewicz, editor; Central European University Press, 2010); “The Hungarian Journalism Education Landscape” in European Journalism Education (Georgios Terzis, editor; Intellect Books, 2009); “The Consolidation of Media Freedom in Post-Communist Democracies” in Finding the Right Place on the Map: Central and Eastern European Media Change in a Global Perspective (Karol Jakubowicz and Miklós Sükösd, editors; The University of Chicago Press, 2008); “Media Policies and Media Politics in East Central Europe: Issues and Trends 1989-2008” (with Miklós Sükösd) in Communications and Cultural Policies in Europe (Fernandez Isabel Alonso and Miquel de Moragas, editors; Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 2008).

**Bangi, Ali Karimzadeh**

Ali Karimzadeh Bangi is the Director of ASL19 (“Article 19” in Farsi), a not-for-profit organization that provides circumvention services to Iranians. Ali is a second-year PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto. Ali’s educational background is in both computer and political science. He has completed undergraduate studies in computer engineering at the University of Tehran and his MA in political science at the University of Toronto. His current research focuses on the militarization of cyberspace.
Brouillette, Amy

Amy Brouillette has been a Research Fellow at the Center for Media and Communication Studies (CMCS) since February 2011. Her current research involves examining Hungary’s new media laws in the European context. Amy has worked as both an on-staff and freelance journalist for more than ten years, reporting for daily, weekly and online U.S.-based publications. Her articles and photography have appeared in the Columbia Journalism Review, The Los Angeles Times and The Denver Post. She holds a master’s degree in journalism from the University of Colorado, Boulder (2007), and a master’s degree in Central European history from CEU (2009). In 2008, she was a visiting graduate student in Harvard’s Russian, Eastern European, and Central Asian Studies (REECA) program, where she studied post-communist media development in Central and Eastern Europe.

Davin, Eric

Eric Davin is a founding Partner of Altai Consulting. He has 10 years of experience in post conflict countries including Afghanistan, Iraq, the West Bank and Gaza, Yemen and Libya. He designs and coordinates large scale studies and Monitoring & Evaluation strategies to accompany Aid & Development programs and key donors like the World Bank, USAID, DFID / FCO, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM and other organizations.

His experience of 10 years of media development in Afghanistan gave him the opportunity to develop large scale surveys and qualitative research on the media landscape and media consumption patterns. The Afghan Media “3 years after” and the Afghan Media in 2010 studies are 2 milestones in the field of research on media development based on a multi-level approach of media impact. Eric and his team also evaluated public information units and strategies, such as the Afghan Educational TV (ERTV), the Peace Media (US Army), of the NSP Public Information unit. In Yemen and the Horn of Africa they assessed Counter Radicalisation projects based on media education. In Libya in 2011, he supervised the first comprehensive research on media, audience, perceptions & expectations in the post-Gadafi context. The study includes data and qualitative research on social media and the way they relay public information and broadcast media. Eric also designed M&E models in a variety of other fields such as migrations, stabilization activities or private sector development.

He has prior experience in consulting and new media development in Australia, USA and France, and holds a MBA from HEC, the French leading school of management.
Faris, Robert

Robert Faris is the Research Director of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University. His recent research includes internet content regulation, state censorship and surveillance practices, broadband and infrastructure policy, and the interaction of new media, online speech, government regulation of the internet and political processes. Rob is a contributor to the OpenNet Initiative, studying internet censorship activities in over 60 countries around the world. He is currently working on the integration and comparison of analytical tools to better understand the structure of online communities and digital media content. Rob also teaches classes on internet policy and the impact of the internet on social and political change.

Prior to joining the Berkman Center in 2006, Rob worked extensively in Latin America and Asia on issues related to economic development, public policy and environmental management. He has held research positions at the Harvard Institute for International Development and at Harvard’s Center for International Development where he worked on applied research projects focused on the role of natural resource management in economic development.

Rob holds a M.A. and PhD in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a B.A. in Anthropology from the University of Pennsylvania.

Hargreaves, Laurence

Laurence Hargreaves is a social researcher working in fragile and post-conflict environments. Laurence currently works for Altai Consulting in Libya, and since October 2011, he has been managing Altai’s quantitative study of Libya’s post-revolution media landscape and consumption patterns, for USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives. This project has enabled him to meet a wide range of state, private and social media actors in Libya. Laurence also manages a project that measures perceptions of military-funded radio stations in northern Afghanistan, and he is the lead evaluator for a cluster of UK-funded community media projects in Yemen, Somalia and Kenya that aim to build community resilience against radical social, political and religious narratives. Prior to working for Altai, Laurence worked for the King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau in Jordan. He read International Relations at King’s College London and Industrial Engineering at the University of Cambridge.
Kovács, Zoltán
Zoltán Kovács, PhD, is the Hungarian State Secretary for Government Communication. He graduated from Kossuth Lajos University of Debrecen as a teacher of history and geography in 1993. From 1990 he worked as a historian at Szabó István Specialist College, and later obtained a history degree from the Institute of History of Kossuth Lajos University and an MA degree at the Central European University.

From 1993 and 2003, he was an assistant lecturer and then senior lecturer at the World History Department of Miskolc University. Then, from 2003 to 2006, he worked as a senior lecturer at the Institute of History of Debrecen University. He was founding editor of the cultural periodical “Debreceni Disputa.” In 2006 he was elected local councillor in Debrecen, and also worked as a communication adviser for the local government.

Mr. Kovács was active in student government, elected president of student body at Debrecen University. He has been a member of Fidesz since 1997. He was nominated by the Association of Cities with County Status to the Board of the Hungarian Television Public Foundation. He was also on the Policy Committee of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions. In 2008, he headed the Hungarian delegation of ACYPL (American Council of Young Political Leaders) during the U.S. election campaign.

Labowitz, Sarah
Sarah Labowitz is a policy advisor to Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Michael Posner. In this role, she develops and advocates State Department policy on a range of human rights and democracy issues. Sarah has served on the staff of the Secretary’s Coordinator for Cyber Issues, and from 2009 to 2011, she ran the State Department’s Internet freedom program, including $50 million in funding to support an open internet for online activists. Before joining the State Department, Sarah worked on issues of business and human rights at the Fair Labor Association and Human Rights First.

Sarah was named to Forbes Magazine’s “30 under 30” list for Law and Policy in January 2012. She is a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (MA in International Relations, 2009) and Grinnell College (BA in History, 2004).
**Mayrhofer-Grünbühel, Ferdinand**

Ferdinand Mayrhofer-Grünbühel was born on 7 January 1945 and grew up in Carinthia, Austria. After high school in Carinthia (including one year as exchange student in the U.S.), he studied law in Vienna and completed the Diplomatic Academy. He joined the Austrian Foreign Ministry in 1968 and became personal assistant to successive Foreign Ministers, Waldheim and Kirchschläger.

Assignments abroad included Spain, Poland, and the United Nations, New York. In 1975 Mayrhofer-Grünbühel joined the UN Secretariat, first as advisor to the Secretary-General, later as Director of the UN Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) in Geneva and as Deputy to the UN Director General in Vienna.

Mayrhofer-Grünbühel served as Ambassador to IAEA, UNIDO and other UN Offices in Vienna, and then, as the Director of the OSCE Secretariat from 1994-1997. From 2001-2005, he served as Austrian Ambassador to Slovenia and from 2005-2009, Ambassador to Hungary. In 2010 he was retained as an advisor to IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency) in Abu Dhabi.

Mayrhofer-Grünbühel is married and has five children. He spends his retirement in Vienna and Carinthia. He continues lecturing on a number of topics.

**Mesterházy, Attila**

Attila Mesterházy was born in Pécs, Hungary, on 30 January 1974. After graduating in Economics at the Budapest University of Economics (BKE), he studied at the International Relations PhD course of Budapest University. In 1997-1998, Mr. Mesterházy worked as head of department at the Prime Minister's Cabinet Office. He joined the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) in 2000 and the next year he started working as an advisor to the communication team of the MSZP Group in the national Parliament. From May 2002, he was the political state secretary of the Ministry of Children, Youth and Sport, and then its successor the Ministry of Youth, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. In 2003, Mesterházy entered the MSZP national committee, becoming its vice-president in 2009. An MP since 2004, Mesterházy was elected rapporteur of NATO's Parliamentary General Assembly's Economic and Security Committee, and member of the East-Western Economic Cooperation Subcommittee and a member of the Transatlantic Economic Relations Subcommittee. In 2009 he became leader of the MSZP Group in the Hungarian Parliament. Mesterházy was nominated by the MSZP to run for the post of Prime Minister at the 2010 parliamentary elections. He was elected leader of the MSZP by the Party Congress on 10 July 2010.
Mujić, Ženet
Ženet Mujić, Senior Adviser to the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, studied German literature and media studies at the University of Konstanz (Germany) (M.A.) and International Relations at the Central European University in Budapest (Hungary) (M.A.). Ženet is a member of the Steering Committee of the International Lawyers Association, based in Oxford, UK.

She is currently Senior Adviser to the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, for whom she covers the free flow of information and pluralism on the internet. She is also the point person for media developments in South East Europe. Prior to assuming this post, she worked in Kosovo, Moldova and Croatia. In Pristina, she coordinated the work of the Media Unit of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo and helped to create a media framework in Kosovo, concentrating on the legislative, regulatory and educational aspects. She also managed a project that established the first radio network for minority media.

Price, Monroe
Monroe Price serves as Director of the Center for Global Communication Studies at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania and Director of the Stanhope Centre for Communications Policy Research in London. Professor Price is the Joseph and Sadie Danciger Professor of Law and Director of the Howard M. Squadron Program in Law, Media and Society at the Cardozo School of Law, where he served as Dean from 1982 to 1991. He graduated magna cum laude from Yale, where he was executive editor of the Yale Law Journal. He clerked for Associate Justice Potter Stewart of the U.S. Supreme Court and was an assistant to Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz.

Price was founding director of the Program in Comparative Media Law and Policy at Wolfson College, Oxford, and a Member of the School of Social Sciences at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. He was deputy director of California Indian Legal Services, one of the founders of the Native American Rights Fund, and author of Law and the American Indian. Among his many books are Media and Sovereignty; Television, The Public Sphere and National Identity; and a treatise on cable television.

Rahimi, Babak
Dr. Babak Rahimi is an Associate Professor in the Program for the Study of Religion at UC San Diego’s Department of Literature. He received a PhD from the European University Institute, Florence, Italy, in October 2004. Dr. Rahimi has also studied at the University of Nottingham, where he obtained a M.A. in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, and London School of Economics and Political Science, where he was a Visiting Fellow at the Department of Anthropology,
2000-2001. He has written numerous articles on culture, religion and politics and regularly writes on contemporary Iraqi and Iranian politics. He has been the recipient of fellowships from the national endowment for the Humanities and Jean Monnet Fellowship at the European University Institute, and was a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC and a visiting scholar at the Internet Institute, University of Oxford. Dr. Rahimi’s current research project is on the relationship between digital culture, politics and religion in post-revolutionary Iran.

Sarikakis, Katharine

Prof. Dr. Katharine Sarikakis’ work is informed by political philosophy and focuses on the political processes and political economic dimensions of media and communications governance, nationally and globally. She is interested in the ways in which empowerment and disempowerment of citizens become inherent elements in public policy addressing communication (either as technology or process) and expression (whether political, cultural or other). In her work, institutions are central spaces for the construction of ideas, legitimacy and exercise of control. Her current research explores these dimensions through the tensions of varying forms and degrees of state intervention upon individuals and communication and media industries.

She is currently working on a research monograph, Communication and Control that explores issues of control over citizenship through commercial and political surveillance and communication and cultural policies of copyright, labor and ownership.

Prof. Dr. Sarikakis is the founding co-editor of the International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics with Prof. Neil Blain (University of Stirling, UK). MCP is a well-known journal that aims to facilitate a forum for critical and astute analysis of contemporary world affairs as these are related to media and cultural politics. Prof. Dr Sarikakis joined the University of Vienna from the University of Leeds on February 1, 2011.

Schallenberg, Alexander

– Born in 1969, Alexander Schallenberg studied law at the University of Vienna and Université Paris II – Panthéon-Assas. Following his studies, he joined the Institut Français des Relations Internationales in Paris as a research assistant. He then completed his postgraduate studies in European Law at the College d’Europe in Bruges, Belgium. In 1997, Mr. Schallenberg joined the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 1999-2000 he served as the head of the department for EU Integration, and from 2000-2005, head of the legal department at the Permanent Representation of Austria to the European Union. He then joined the Cabinet of Ursula Plassnik, Minister for European and International Affairs, serving as her spokesman. Since 2008, he has served on the cabinet and as spokesman for the Minister for European and International Affairs, Michael Spindelegger. He is
also in charge of coordination of foreign policy press and information. He currently serves as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Mr. Spindelegger, now the Austrian Vice Chancellor as in addition to his previous post of Minister for European and International Affairs.

**Smith, Briar**

Briar Smith is Research Project Manager at CGCS. While a graduate student at Annenberg School for Communication, Briar worked closely on a number of CGCS’s China initiatives, including teaching at the Penn-in-Beijing summer school and authoring a chapter in the Center’s publication of *Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China*. Her research interests include international cultural communications with particular focus on China and the Middle East, and the cultural politics of the body in contemporary Islamic contexts. Briar has a Master’s degree in Communication from the University of Pennsylvania and a BA in Chinese Language and Literature and Psychology from Swarthmore College.

**Valeriani, Augusto**

Augusto Valeriani, PhD, is a postdoctoral research fellow at Università di Bologna where he lectures in Media and International Politics. He is also Fellow of the Center for Global Communication Studies at Annenberg (UPenn) and of the Arab Media Centre at University of Westminster. Augusto has published many articles on mass media and international politics, new media and society, with a focus on the Arab context. He is the author of three monographs: *Il giornalismo arabo* (*The Arab Journalism*, 2005); *Effetto Al Jazeera* (*The Al Jazeera Effect*, 2010) and *Twitter Factor* (2011). In 2009 he co-edited a volume on Arab opinions during the 2008 U.S. Presidential Campaign. His latest research work on leadership, new media and social movements during the Arab Spring is forthcoming in *Sociologica Journal* (Il Mulino, Bologna).

**Weiss, George**

George Weiss is the founder and CEO of Radio La Benevolencija Humanitarian Tools Foundation (“La Benevolencija”), an organization that sets up media projects to teach populations to resist hate speech and incitement to mass hate violence. The organization is one of the first to use long-duration nationwide broadcast campaigns to mass audiences for the purpose of a citizen “inoculation” against scapegoating and propaganda, as well as teaching trauma healing techniques to the wounded populations. Based on Weiss’ experiences working for La Benevolencija Sarajevo, a unique local NGO during the Bosnia War of 1992-95, this work promotes an agenda of sanity, empathy and mutual help among minorities and individuals who are the target of hate speech, as well as among societies that have suffered its consequences.
A film and television producer, Weiss moved into the emerging field of humanitarian activist media in 2001, in cooperation with genocide psychologist and scholar Ervin Staub and trauma psychologist Laurie Pearlman. He set up Radio Benevolencija HTF in 2002. The organization's Great Lakes Reconciliation Radio, a regional project in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi using radio and TV broadcasts in coordination with grass roots activities, has gained international acclaim for its unique combination of applied psychology with education-entertainment techniques. The Rwanda part of the operation serves as a prototype intervention whose results are evaluated regularly to test its impact over a long duration, in order to enable the project to be used to counteract a continuum of violence, ranging from hate speech to incitement to genocide, anywhere around the world.

**Winkler, Hans**

Hans Winkler is Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna and a former Austrian diplomat and Secretary of State. Upon graduation from the University of Vienna (Dr. Juris) and the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, Hans Winkler began his career in the Austrian foreign ministry in 1970. He held various positions in Austrian missions, was the permanent representative of Austria at the Council of Europe in 1990s and in 1996 he became head of the Department for North and South America in the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Between 1999 and 2005 he was head of the Office of International Law and, additionally, from 2002 Deputy Secretary General. On 4 July 2005, Winkler was appointed Secretary of State in the Ministry for European and International Affairs, a position that he also held in the Gusenbauer government until December 2008. On 1 April 2009 Winkler was appointed Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna.
Other Participants and Guests

**Coyer, Kate**
Kate Coyer is the Director of the CMCS, and teaches in the Departments of Public Policy and Political Science of the CEU. Previously, she held a Postdoctoral Research Fellowship with the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania. Kate has also taught at the University of California, Berkeley, and Goldsmiths College, University of London, where she received her PhD. Her current research projects center on comparative media and communication policy, the relationship between technology and activism, community media, and the role of civil society in policy making processes. She is the co-author of the *Alternative Media Handbook*, an advisor on Hungarian media law research, and provides expertise on a range of media policy issues internationally. In addition to her academic work, Kate has been producing media, helping build community radio stations, and organizing practical and policy workshops for the past twenty years.

**Umaraliey, Tulkinzhon**
Tolkun Umaraliey (Kyrgyzstan) currently works for RFE/RL in Bishkek, and also coordinates Kyrgyzstani blogs at neweurasia.net, where he previously coordinated Uzbekistani blogs. He has a wide range of experience in areas such as development, human rights, international refugee protection, mass media, blogging and citizen media and has worked with an array of organizations, including Mercy Corps International, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Washington Times, Global Voices Online and Transitions Online. He has also cooperated with McClatchy newspapers, Al Jazeera English, AFP, the BBC, and Stars and Stripes.

**Yazbeck, Natacha**
Natacha Yazbeck is a media consultant and freelance journalist based in the Middle East. As a Middle East correspondent for Agence France-Presse, she covered popular protests in Bahrain and later Syria, where she was based in the flashpoint protest city of Daraa. She holds an M.A. in Sociology from the American University of Beirut and is an incoming doctoral student at the Annenberg School for Communication, the University of Pennsylvania. Her research focuses on nascent models of media and sociopolitical movements in the Arab world and the role they will play in reshaping media and political landscapes of the region.
### Student Participants from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

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<th>Student</th>
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<td>RADAUER, Clemens Georg</td>
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**ABOUT THE ORGANIZERS**

**The American Austrian Foundation (AAF)**
The American Austrian Foundation (AAF) was established in 1984, by a group of Americans and Austrians with an interest in promoting a positive relationship between the two countries. The AAF partners with NGOs, governments and individuals to bridge the gap between professionals in developed countries and countries in transition, by providing fellowships to attend post-graduate educational programs in medicine, media and the arts. The American Austrian Foundation is a public non-profit organization incorporated under the laws of Delaware and has 501(c) (3) status with the United States Internal Revenue Service.

**Center for Global Communication Studies (CGCS) at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania**
The Center for Global Communication Studies (CGCS) is a leader in international education and training in comparative media law and policy. It affords students, academics, lawyers, regulators, civil society representatives and others the opportunity to evaluate and discuss comparative, global and international communications issues. Working with the Annenberg School, the University of Pennsylvania, and research centers, scholars and practitioners from around the world, CGCS provides research opportunities for graduate students; organizes conferences and trainings; and provides consulting and advisory assistance to academic centers, governments, and NGOs. CGCS draws on various disciplines, including law, political science, and international relations, among others. The Center’s research and policy work addresses issues of media regulation, media and democracy, measuring and evaluation of media development programs, public service broadcasting, and the media’s role in conflict and post-conflict environments.

**The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna (DA)**
The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna (DA) offers post-graduate training for the varied challenges of an international career. The DA equips its students with the academic qualifications, language training, intercultural competences and management skills, which are essential and often decisive prerequisites for many international professions and a subsequent interesting career. Furthermore, the DA offers a Summer Course for German as a foreign language and Austrian Studies. In addition to its study programmes, the DA organizes conferences and a great number of public lectures with well-known political, diplomatic, business and cultural figures. Publications of the DA (“Favorita Papers”) offer substantive contributions from academicians taken from selected conferences in the field of international relations.
The Organizing Team

Arsenault, Amelia

Amelia Arsenault is an Assistant Professor of Communication at Georgia State University and serves as the Media and Democracy Research Fellow at the Center for Global Communication Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, Annenberg School. Her scholarly interests center on how different international and domestic actors have attempted to leverage the changing dynamics of communications systems, and the ramifications of those activities for international relations, political and social power relationships, and north/south inequality. In this capacity, she has conducted research on global media ownership, the impact of international donors in the southern African communications development, network theory, new media, and public diplomacy. Her current research projects include: a longitudinal investigation of the activities of international actors in the communications sector in southern Africa; and a co-edited book project (with Rhonda Zaharna and Ali Fischer) on the subject of collaborative and networked public diplomacy. Her scholarly work has appeared in the *International Journal of Communication, International Sociology, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, and *Information, Communication, and Society*. She holds a B.A. in Film and History from Dartmouth College and an MSc in Global Media and Communication from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a PhD from the University of Southern California Annenberg School. Prior to her academic career, she spent several years as the film coordinator for the Zimbabwe International Film Festival Trust, a non-profit visual literacy organization in Harare, Zimbabwe.

Eltz-Aulitzky, Katharine

Katharine Eltz-Aulitzky is the Executive Director of The American Austrian Foundation (AAF). The AAF has offices in New York, Vienna and Salzburg.

She oversees the AAF’s programs in medicine, media and the arts, and is responsible for fundraising and program content.
**Price, Monroe**

Monroe Price serves as Director of the Center for Global Communication Studies at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania and Director of the Stanhope Centre for Communications Policy Research in London. Professor Price is the Joseph and Sadie Danciger Professor of Law and Director of the Howard M. Squadron Program in Law, Media and Society at the Cardozo School of Law, where he served as Dean from 1982 to 1991. He graduated magna cum laude from Yale, where he was executive editor of the *Yale Law Journal*. He clerked for Associate Justice Potter Stewart of the U.S. Supreme Court and was an assistant to Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz.

Price was founding director of the Program in Comparative Media Law and Policy at Wolfson College, Oxford, and a Member of the School of Social Sciences at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. He was deputy director of California Indian Legal Services, one of the founders of the Native American Rights Fund, and author of *Law and the American Indian*. Among his many books are *Media and Sovereignty; Television, The Public Sphere and National Identity*; and a treatise on cable television.

**Winkler, Hans**

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Upon graduation from the University of Vienna (Dr. Juris) and the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, Hans Winkler began his career in the Austrian foreign ministry in 1970. He held various positions in Austrian missions, was the permanent representative of Austria at the Council of Europe in 1990s and in 1996 he became head of the Department for North and South America in the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Between 1999 and 2005 he was head of the Office of International Law and, additionally, from 2002 Deputy Secretary General. On 4 July 2005, Winkler was appointed Secretary of State in the Ministry for European and International Affairs, a position that he also held in the Gusenbauer government until December 2008. On 1 April 2009 Winkler was appointed Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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